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FOURTH CIRCUIT RE VIE W
court's oversight indicates the court's willingness to apply the Younger
doctrine to almost any situation, civil or criminal, so long as a pending
state proceeding exists. Consequently, if a state proceeding of any type
is pending, a complainant will not be able to bring a section 1983 action
and have his action heard before a federal court regardless of whether




A. Concerted Activities: Judicial Interpretation of
Section 7 of the NLRA
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)' establishes the basic
rights of employees in private industry' by guaranteeing the right to
labor organization and collective bargaining.' Section 7 of the NLRA
guarantees the right of employees to engage in "concerted activities" for
collective bargaining purposes or other mutual aid or protection.' Sec-
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
2 See 2 KHEEL, LABOR LAW §.9A.01 (1981) [hereinafter cited as KHEEL]. The National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) does not apply to public sector employees. See 9 KHEEL, supra,
§§ 43.01 & 43.02. Public sector employees work for either federal, state or local govern-
ments. Id. Many jurisdictions provide public sector employees the right to organize and
bargain collectively through statutory enactment or judicial action. Id. § 44.01(3); see
McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1968) (first case to hold that public
employees have constitutional right to join, form, and assist unions).
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 & 158 (1976). The NLRA declares in § 1 that a goal of national
labor policy is to grant workers the opportunity to have full freedom of association, self
organization and representation for mutual aid or protection. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). The
purpose of the NLRA is to eliminate inequality of bargaining power between employees and
employers in order to minimize industrial strife. Id.; see Note, The Requirement of "Con-
certed" Action Under the NLRA, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 514, 526 (1953) [hereinafter cited as
"Concerted" Action]. By granting workers the right to organize Congress provided
employees with bargaining power in the form of numerical strength so that employees and
employers could negotiate and settle labor disputes without the need for judicial interven-
tion. See Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319, 323 (1951)
[hereinafter cited as Cox]; "Concerted"Action, supra, at 526-27. The NLRA also created the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as the administrative authority for enforcement of
the Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-156 (1976). The NLRB has the authority to prevent any person
from engaging in unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a); see text accompanying notes
22-24 infra.
4 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). The basic intent of § 7 of the NLRA is to enable employees to
work together without fear of retaliation by employers. See Valley Mould & Iron Corp. v.
NLRB, 116 F.2d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 590 (1941). In drafting § 7,
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tion 8(a)(1) serves as an enforcement mechanism of section 7 by forbid-
ding employers to restrain, coerce, or interfere with employees in the
exercise of their statutorily conferred rights.5 Section 8(a)(1) is only ap-
plicable, however, if the complaining employee was engaging in a pro-
tected activity at the time of the employer's interference.' A court's in-
terpretation of the term "concerted activity," therefore, is crucial in
cases involving alleged acts of unfair labor practices under section 77
Picket lines and strikes are the most obvious examples of section 7
concerted activity.' Concerted activity, however, encompasses other in-
dividual and group activities that further legitimate employee interests.9
An employee's action constitutes concerted activity for the purposes of
Congress recognized that labor's cause is often advanced on fronts other than union
representation or collective bargaining. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978). Con-
gress recognized this fact by incorporating the broad language, "mutual aid or protection"
into the NLRA. Id. A labor organization, therefore, is not a prerequisite for employees to
receive § 7 protections. NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845 (1948).
By use of the term concerted activity in § 7, however, Congress required that there be
a "group" aspect to every activity undertaken to further employee interests. See text ac-
companying notes 35-36 infra. Without the group aspect, an activity will not constitute a § 7
protected action. See Cox, supra note 3, at 320. Two possible reasons exist for the concerted
requirement. First, employee bargaining power might lose its effectiveness if employees
split into several factions. "Concerted" Action, supra note 3, at 527. It is desirable,
therefore, to assure that employees act together as a collective unit. Id. Second, the effec-
tiveness of the collective bargaining process depends, in part, on the fact that an employer
has an identifiable and responsible opponent with whom to negotiate disputes. Id. Requiring
employees to act as a group provides employers with an organized and identifiable oppo-
nent. Id.
, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
6 Cox, supra note 3, at 320; see note 4 supra (protected activity discussed).
7 Cox, supra note 3, at 320.
' See International Longshoremen's Ass'n Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397
U.S. 195, 200-01 (1970) (union's peaceful picketing to protest lower than average wage rates
constituted protected activity under § 7); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 231
(1963) (employer according super seniority to workers replacing strikers was unfair labor
practice that interfered with employees' protected right to strike).
' See 2 KHEEL, supra note 2, § 9A.04(1). The common dictionary definitions of "con-
certed" include "mutually contrived or planned" and "agreed on." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 55 (2d ed. 1940). The § 7 concerted activity re-
quirement suggests, therefore, that more than one person must contribute to an activity
before that activity will acquire "concerted" status. See Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v.
NLRB, 635 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1980). The judicial applications of § 7, however, have not
adhered rigidly to a dictionary meaning of the term concerted activity. See Note, Construc-
tive Concerted Activity and Individual Rights: The Northern Metal-Interboro Split, 121 U.
PA. L. REV. 152, 153 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Interboro Split]; text accompanying notes
34-40 infra. Courts generally attempt to interpret "concerted activity" in accordance with
the policies underlying the NLRA. See notes 3 & 4 supra. Individual action, therefore, can
acquire concerted status if that action furthers the interests of employees as a group.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1969) (concerted ac-
tivity existed when single employee circulated petition complaining of working conditions in
attempt to enlist support of co-workers); see text accompanying notes 35-36 infra.
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the NLRA if the action comprises a lawful,"0 work-related grievance"
that furthers group interests 2 and seeks a specific result or remedy.
13
The critical question presented by section 7 cases is whether an
employee's activity furthers legitimate group interests." In Krispy
Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB," the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered the group interest question in a review of a National Labor
, 2 KHEEL, supra note 2, § 9A.04(1). Conduct otherwise constituting concerted activity
will not receive protection under the NLRA if the conduct is unlawful. Mt. Vernon Tanker
Co. v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 571, 574-75 (9th Cir. 1977). Violent conduct does not merit § 7 protec-
tion. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 252 (1939). Conduct that con-
stitutes breach of a contract is also outside the scope of § 7. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306
U.S. 332, 344 (1939).
" 2 KHEEL, supra note 2, § 9A.04(1). Generally, courts take a liberal attitude in deter-
mining whether employee activity is sufficiently work-related to receive § 7 protection. See
NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14-15 (1962) (no requirement that concerted
activity be union related); Kaiser Engineers v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 1379, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1976)
(no requirement that concerted activity take place on employer's premises); Electromec
Design & Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 1969) (no requirement that concerted
activity occur during working hours); Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 752
(4th Cir. 1949) (no requirement that concerted activity occur in collective bargaining con-
text). Courts have found grievances to be work-related in myriad situations. See, e.g.,
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 573-76 (1978) (union distribution of bulletins urging sup-
port for national minimum wage increases was concerted activity); 538 F.2d at 1384-85
(employee involvement in legislative lobby opposing proposed changes in immigration policy
was concerted activity); NLRB v. J. G. Boswell Co., 136 F.2d 585, 595 (9th Cir. 1943)
(employee engaged in concerted activity when she voiced sympathy towards another
employer's striking workers); Ft. Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. v. NLRB, 111 F.2d 869,
873-74 (7th Cir. 1940) (employee engaged in concerted activity when he aided another
employer's workers to organize). The general rule of these cases is that, to be work-related,
activities need only reasonably affect conditions of employment. Cf. G & W Elec. Specialty
Co. v. NLRB, 360 F.2d 873, 876-77 (7th Cir. 1966) (no concerted activity when one employee
attempted to initiate movement to control abuses in an employee-established credit union
since employer had no control over union's affairs).
" 2 KHEEL, supra note 2, § 9A.04(1); see text accompanying notes 34-39 infra.
13 2 KHEEL, supra note 2, § 9A.04(1). In NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S.
9, 14-15 (1962), the Supreme Court held that § 7 does not require notice to the employer of
an activity undertaken to correct a grievance, even in the absence of a regular grievance
procedure, provided that the employer is reasonably aware of employee dissatisfaction. Id.
Courts do require, however, that employees engage in action with a specified result in mind.
Compare 370 U.S. at 14 with NLRB v. Jamestown Veneer & Plywood Corp., 194 F.2d 192,
194 (2d Cir. 1952). In Washington Aluminum Co., the employees staged a walkout to protest
the inadequate heating of the shop in which they worked. 370 U.S. at 10. The employees did
not plan the walkout which happened to occur on a particularly cold winter day. 370 U.S. at
14-15. The Supreme Court implied, however, that in view of past repeated complaints about
the cold working conditions, it was clear that the employees had a specific result in mind
when they left the shop. See id. at 14-15. In Jamestown, on the other hand, the Second Cir-
cuit upheld the discharge of four employees who abruptly walked off the job after receiving
layoff notices. 194 F.2d at 194. The court found that the action did not contemplate a specific
result, and that the employees left the job because they resented receiving the layoff
notices. Id
" See 2 KHEEL, supra note 2, § 9A.04(1); text accompanying notes 35-36 infra.
15 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1980).
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Relations Board (NLRB) order requiring the reinstatement of an em-
ployee who claimed that the company had discharged him in violation of
section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. 16
The Krispy Kreme Company discharged employee Terry Boggs for
his careless attitude towards safety and his preoccupation with filing
workmen's compensation claims. 7 Boggs had filed four workmen's com-
pensation claims for injuries sustained while on the job in his two years
of employment with Krispy Kreme."1 Krispy Kreme's belief that Boggs'
claims were of "dubious validity," 9 the reflection made by the claims
upon the quality of conditions in Boggs' working environment, and
Boggs' failure to heed company advice about the inappropriateness of fil-
ing a workmen's compensation claim for his latest injury precipitated a
company investigation of his employment record." The investigation
revealed that Boggs was overly concerned with filing workmen's com-




Boggs objected to his discharge on the grounds that Krispy Kreme
fired him as a means to restrain the exercise of what Boggs considered
to be a protected activity under section 7, and appealed to the NLRB to
handle his case. 2 The NLRB subsequently issued a complaint against
11 Id at 305; see text accompanying notes 3-5 supra and note 22 infra. The Krispy
Kreme court reviewed an NLRB order that required the Krispy Kreme Company to
reinstate Boggs with back pay. 635 F.2d at 305. The question before the court was whether
to enforce the NLRB's order. See id.
" 635 F.2d at 305.
" Id. In Krispy Kreme, Boggs filed four workmen's compensation claims in two years,
and each claim involved a relatively unusual injury. Id. The first incident occurred when
Boggs used a sledgehammer to loosen sugar stored in a bin. See Brief of Petitioner at 8, 635
F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Petitioner]. A blow of the hammer
dislodged a piece of the metal bin which struck Boggs in the nose. Id Boggs' second claim
arose when he sustained injuries as a result of entangling his arm in a stair rail. Id. The
third injury occurred when Boggs fell over backwards in a swivel chair. Id at 9. The fourth
incident related to the chest pains Boggs allegedly sustained after he spent time blasting
flour dust from the ceiling and fixtures of a working room designated for inspection. Id. at
10. Some dispute existed as to whether Boggs' flour blasting duties caused his chest pains.
Id. Flour blasting is a routine process to remove flour dust and other material from
workrooms by means of a compressed airhose. Id In addition to these four claims, Boggs
missed work for a four month period after sustaining injuries in an automobile accident that
was not work-related. Id. at 8.
"9 635 F.2d at 305; Brief of Petitioner, supra note 18, at 4.
o 635 F.2d at 305.
21 Id.
' See id. at 306. Congress created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as an
administrative agency to enforce the provisions of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-156 (1976).
The office of General Counsel of the NRLB has the authority to investigate unfair labor
practices, to decide whether particular charges warrant the issuance of complaints, and to
direct the prosecution of any complaints, including any court proceedings to enforce or
review NLRB decisions. See NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R §§ 100.735.2,
101.2-101.16 (1981); A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 104
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Krispy Kreme alleging that the company had discharged Boggs in viola-
tion of section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.' An Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ)24 found that the reason for Boggs' discharge was his intention to
file a workmen's compensation claim and that Boggs' refusal to refrain
from filing his claim, upon the request of a company official, fell within
the scope of section 7 protected activities.' The ALJ, therefore, con-
cluded that Krispy Kreme violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.2 The
NLRB affirmed these findings and ordered Krispy Kreme to reinstate
Boggs with back pay.' The company appealed to the Fourth Circuit.'
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit considered whether Boggs was engag-
ing in a protected activity at the time of his termination.' The court
noted that some courts regard concerted activity as a term of art rather
than a literal description requiring actual participation by more than one
(9th ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as LABOR LAW]. The General Counsel may issue a complaint
only upon a formal charge of an unfair labor practice. 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.2-101.4; LABOR LAW
at 105. Any person, employer or labor organization may file such charges in the office of the
General Counsel for the region in which the alleged unfair practice occurred. 29 C.F.R. §
101.2; LABOR LAW at 105. Upon the filing of a charge, a field examiner conducts a thorough
investigation to determine the validity of each charge. 29 C.F.R. § 101.4; LABOR LAW at 105.
At the end of the preliminary investigation, the Regional Director may drop the case, at-
tempt settlement, enter a cease-and-desist order, or commence formal proceedings by filing
a complaint. 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.6-101.9; LABOR LAW at 105-06. Regional directors have authority
to issue complaints in all cases not involving novel or complex issues. 29 C.F.R. § 101.8;
LABOR LAW at 107. The complaint specifies the alleged violations of the NLRA as well as
the time and place of hearing. 29 C.F.R. § 101.8; LABOR LAW at 107. The respondent has the
right to answer the charges prior to the hearing. 29 C.F.R. § 101.8; LABOR LAW at 107. The
hearing is before an Administrative Law Judge (AL), usually in the city or town where the
alleged unfair labor practice occurred. 29 C.F.R. § 101.10; LABOR LAW at 107. The hearing
proceeds in the same manner as does litigation in the federal district courts. 29 C.F.R. §
101.10; LABOR LAW at 107; see 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976). The ALJ is thus the first official to
hear labor disputes. 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.34 & 102.6; LABOR LAW at 107. The AN then files a
decision with the NLRB containing proposed findings of fact and recommendations for
disposition of the case. 29 C.F.R. § 101.11; LABOR LAW at 108. Counsel for any party may
make exceptions within twenty days after the ALJ files his decision. 29 C.F.R. § 101.11;
LABOR LAW at 108. The NLRB then renders a decision based on the complete record of each
case. 29 C.F.R. § 101.12; LABOR LAW at 108. Board orders carry no sanctions, but the NLRB
may enforce its decision by filing a petition in a federal court of appeals. 29 C.F.R § 101.14;
LABOR LAW at 109. Similarly, the respondent can seek review of the NLRB's decision by fil-
ing a petition in a federal court of appeals. 29 C.F.R. § 101.14; LABOR LAW at 109. In review-
ing an order of the NLRB, courts must accept the findings of fact if substantial evidence
supports those findings. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490-91 (1951).
635 F.2d at 306.
" See note 22 supra (discussing function of Administrative Law Judge in NLRB
grievance procedures).
635 F.2d at 306.
2, Id
11 1&; see Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp., 245 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1053-54, 102 L.R.R.M.
1492 (1979); note 22 supra.
' 635 F.2d at 305.
29 d-
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employee." A single employee's action thus may qualify as a concerted
activity. 1 The Krispy Kreme court, however, drew a distinction between
an individual action intended to enlist the support of other employees,
and an action for the benefit of employees in a theoretical sense.2 In
making the distinction, the court discussed two judicial interpretations
of what constitutes concerted activity.2 One interpretation establishes
the "element or purpose" rule.3 4 Before an employee's action can attain
protected status under the element or purpose rule, some element of col-
lectivity to that action must exist, or at the very least, there must be a
showing that the purpose of the particular activity contemplated collec-
tive action. 5 In addition, the purpose of the activity must be a
legitimate, work-related goal for the mutual aid or protection of the
employees.3 ' The second interpretation is the "constructive concerted ac-
I See id. The Fourth Circuit in Krispy Kreme accepted as undisputed the NLRB's
conclusion that Boggs' failure to forego filing a workmen's compensation claim precipitated
his discharge. Id.; Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153, 1160 (5th Cir. 1980); see note 9
supra and note 34 infra.
3' 635 F.2d at 306; see note 9 supra.
635 F.2d at 307-08; Owens--orning Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365
(4th Cir. 1969).
635 F.2d at 307-09.
3 Id. at 308; see Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 684-85 (3d Cir. 1964).
The Mushroom case is an example of the "element or purpose" method of determining what
type of individual employee action constitutes concerted activity. Id. In Mushroom, an
employee had been advising his colleagues that their union contract entitled all company
drivers to benefits that they were not receiving. Id. at 684. The company fired the employee
when a rumor of the employee's actions reached management. Id. The employee contested
his discharge, claiming his advice constituted an attempt to gain support for a group move-
ment that would seek enforcement of the employees' contractual rights. See id. The Third
Circuit could not justify the employee's dialogues as actions that contemplated group activity.
Id. at 684-85. The court explained that preliminary conversations could qualify as concerted
activities only if the object of discussion was actually to initiate group action in the interest
of all fellow employees. Id. at 685. The Third Circuit did not believe that the employee's ac-
tions satisfied this requirement. Id. The court made clear, however, that the mere fact that
an individual acted alone does not preclude automatically that he was acting for the mutual
aid or protection of his co-workers. Id.; accord, Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153,
1160 (5th Cir. 1980); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir.
1969).
, 330 F.2d at 684-85; Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153, 1160 (5th Cir. 1980); see
note 9 supra.
' 330 F.2d at 684-85; see 2 KHEEL, supra note 2, § 9A.04(1). Courts generally have
recognized legitiniate safety concerns as purposes that will give an activity protected
status. See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1009, 1017 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981) (employees who protested unsafe working conditions had
proper purpose); Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 320, 327 (7th Cir. 1976) (em-
ployees who protested inadequacy of supervision directly affecting their safety had proper
purpose); cf. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1969)
(employees who protested inadequate working conditions when employer refused permis-
sion for employee to drive home co-worker who had just received notice of wife's death had
proper purpose). Generally, courts do not extend protected status to activities that do not
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tivity" approach. 7 The constructive concerted activity rule extends the
coverage of section 7 and the element or purpose rule to include the ac-
tivity of an individual who acts pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement without requiring precise proof of existent- mutual concern on
the part of other employees. The collective bargaining agreement
serves as sufficient evidence of mutual interest to allow courts following
the constructive concerted activity rule to infer the necessary element
of collectivity in the action of a single employee. 9 The rationale for ex-
tending the element or purpose rule to encompass individual action that
attempts to implement the terms of a collective bargaining agreement is
that such action is merely an extension of the concerted activity that
was necessary originally to draft the provisions of the agreement.40
have a proper purpose. See, e.g., Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273,276-77 (7th Cir.
1967) (no proper purpose when employee prepared and displayed cartoons in protest of
relatively insignificant increases contained in new wage and benefit package); Joanna Cotton
Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 753 (4th Cir. 1949) (employee circulating petition calling for
removal of supervisor did not have proper purpose when evidence showed petition was
form of retaliation for reprimand issued by supervisor). In addition, courts are unlikely to
grant protected status to individual activity involving wage disputes. See Pelton Casteel,
Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23, 29 (7th Cir. 1980) (employee's general complaints about job rates
and overtime did not constitute concerted activity); NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc.,
481 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1973) (employee's refusal to sign new contract that reduced com-
mission rates did not constitute concerted activity since all other workers had accepted con-
tract's terms); 371 F.2d at 276 (employee's cartoon drawings protesting ridiculousness of a
wage increase did not amount to concerted activity). But see NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp., 452
F.2d 205, 207 (7th Cir. 1971) (janitor's action in trying to secure pay raise was concerted ac-
tivity).
3 See NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967). Interboro ad-
vocates the constructive concerted activity approach for purposes of determining what type
of individual activity constitutes concerted activity. In Interboro an employee made several
legitimate complaints about his employer's lack of adherence to safety standards required
by a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 497-98. The employee's complaints precipitated
his discharge as a troublemaker. Id at 498. The NLRB determined that the employee's com-
plaints constituted concerted activity since he voiced his concerns in an effort to secure com-
pliance with the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 499; see Interboro Split, supra note
9, at 158. The Interboro court agreed that compliance affected the rights of all employees
and thus extended the meaning of concerted activity to encompass individual actions done
even in the absence of proof of mutual interest on the part of fellow employees. 388 F.2d at
500. The collective bargaining agreement allowed the Interboro court to imply a mutual in-
terest in the employee's actions on the part of his co-workers. Id. The Second Circuit later
qualified the Interboro rule in NLRB v. John Langenbacher Co., 398 F.2d 459, 463 (2d Cir.
1968). In Langenbacher, the court held that under the Interboro rule, employees must have
a "reasonable basis" for believing a certain interpretation of a collective bargaining agree-
ment before a particular activity can attain concerted status. See id.
1 ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 716 (6th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. C & IAir Condition-
ing, Inc., 486 F.2d 977, 978-79 (9th Cir. 1973).
See NLRB v. Bighorn Beverage, 614 F.2d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1980) (collective
bargaining agreement was essential basis for employee's claimed right to § 7 protection).
40 ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 716 (6th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. C & I Air Condition-
ing, Inc., 486 F.2d 977, 978-79 (9th Cir. 1973).
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The Fourth Circhit stated that the absence of a collective bargaining
agreement in Krispy Kreme precluded the court from deciding the
validity of the constructive concerted activity rule."1 The court relied in-
stead upon Fourth Circuit precedent that followed the element or pur-
pose rule, and focused on the purpose of Boggs' activity in determining
whether Krispy Kreme discharged Boggs improperly.2 The Krispy
Kreme court determined that the record did not suggest that Boggs con-
templated group activity when he resisted his employer's request not to
file a workmen's compensation claim." No other Krispy Kreme employ-
ees participated in the dispute over filing a workmen's compensation
claim." In addition, Boggs gave no indication that he was representing
the rights of other employees.' Finally, no contract or agreement in-
dicated what the concerns of Boggs' fellow employees might be." The
Fourth Circuit held, therefore, that Boggs was not engaging in protected
activity at the time of his discharge." Accordingly, the court refused to
enforce the NLRB's reinstatement order.4
8
In denying enforcement of the order, the Fourth Circuit reserved
judgment on the validity of the constructive concerted activity rule.
49
Furthermore, the court refused to extend the constructive concerted ac-
tivity rule to a situation in which there was no collective bargaining
agreement, and thus no basis for implying group interest.50 The court re-
jected the NLRB's argument that whenever an individual employee acts
in a matter that arises out of an employment relationship, a presumption
of common interest exists that the employer may later refute. 1 The
" 635 F.2d at 309.
42 Id at 307-08; see Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th
Cir. 1969) (concerted activity when single employee circulated petition complaining of work-
ing conditions intending to enlist support of co-workers); Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB,
176 F.2d 749, 753 (4th Cir. 1949) (no concerted activity when employee circulated petition
calling for removal of supervisor and evidence showed employee acted solely to vindicate
himself for reprimand supervisor had issued).
635 F.2d at 308.
"I d.
"5Id.
" See id. at 309; text accompanying notes 36-41 supra.
41 635 F.2d at 3i0.
4 Id.
" Id at 309. The Krispy Kreme court neither embraced nor rejected the constructive
concerted activity rule, but stated that the absence of a collective bargaining agreement
rendered unnecessary a decision on the appropriateness in the Fourth Circuit of the con-
structive concerted activity rule. Id.; see text accompanying notes 59, 61 & 67 infra.
See 635 F.2d at 309-10; text accompanying notes 38-41 supra.
'1 635 F.2d at 309. The NLRB's argument in Krispy Kreme that a presumption of com-
mon interest exists whenever an employee acts in a matter that arises out of an employ-
ment relationship conflicts with established authority requiring a showing that the
activity's purpose is for mutual aid or protection. See Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330
F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964); notes 34 & 36 supra; cf. Kaiser Engineers v. NLRB, 538 F.2d
1379 (9th Cir. 1976). in Kaiser, several employee engineers lobbied Congress for retention of
immigration quotas for foreign engineers. Id at 1382. The Ninth Circuit held that the lobby-
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Krispy Kreme court noted that the NLRB believed the presumption
argument was particularly applicable to situations similar to Boggs' in
which the employee's complaint relates to federal or state work safety
or compensation statutes 2 The Fourth Circuit observed, however, that
concerted activity is an essential prerequisite for NLRB action.- Con-
certed activity becomes, in effect, a jurisdictional requirement 4 that the
NLRB must meet in order to establish the basis for its authority to act.5
The Fourth Circuit refused to extend the NLRB's authority on the basis
of a theoretical presumption that all employees share mutual interests
pursuant to a statutory scheme."
No courts have accepted the theory that an individual employee's ac-
tivity can receive protected status as a concerted activity on the basis of
a theoretical presumption of mutual concern. 7 Few courts have accepted
ing was a protected activity even though the lobbying effort involved no request for action
on the part of the company. Id. at 1385. As members of the Civil Engineering Society, the
engineers had a legitimate concern in a national policy that might have affected their job
security. Id.
The NLRB has extended the meaning of concerted activity to include situations where
no collective bargaining agreement exists as evidence of group concern or interest. See Self
Cycle and Marine Distrib. Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 75, 76, 98 L.R.R.M. 1517 (1978). In Self Cycle,
the NLRB found a concerted activity when an individual employee pursued an unemploy-
ment claim. Id The lack of a collective bargaining agreement did not affect the determina-
tion. Id at 75-76. The NLRB implied group concern by declaring that state compensation
laws benefited all employees. Id. The NLRB required no further evidence of group concern.
Id A similar NLRB case is Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000, 91 L.R.R.M; 1131
(1975). In Alleluia, the NLRB extended § 7 coverage to an individual employee who, acting
alone, filed an occupational safety complaint with a state agency. Id. The NLRB inferred
mutual concern from the legislative scheme of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976). 221 N.L.R.B. at 1000.
635 F.2d at 309. In enacting the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA),
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976), Congress articulated a national policy in favor of workmen's
compensation laws. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 & 676 (1976). Section 27(a)(1) of the Act states that a
worker's basic economic security requires an efficient system of workmen's compensation.
See 29 U.S.C. § 676(a) (1976). Boggs' activity was aimed, conceivably, at furthering notions of
economic security held by workers across the nation. Cf. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co. v.
NLRB, 114 F.2d 930, 937 (1st Cir. 1940). In Bethlehem, the court found that employees who
appeared before state legislative committees to voice support over changes in, the
workmen's compensation laws had engaged in a concerted activity. Id at 937. The holding of
Bethlehem implies that Boggs' activity did have group support by virtue of every
employee's conceivable interest in a state statute that provides for a workmen's compensa-
tion program. But see text accompanying note 65 infra.
635 F.2d at 310.
Id
ld.; see 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1976).
See 635 F.2d at 310. The Krispy Kreme court noted that establishing a presumption
of group concern in all cases would not merely shift the burden of proving.the concerted or
nonconcerted nature of an activity from employee to employer, but would render the
presumption irrebuttable, since the manner in which an employer could obtain evidence to
rebut a presumption of group interest is very unclear. Id. at 309.
" See id. The Krispy Kreme court noted that the NLRB could not cite any circuit deci-
sion that supports the theory of presumed concerted activity. Id- But see Kaiser Engineers
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the constructive concerted activity rule, although many courts discuss
the rule's possible application.' Thus, the Krispy Kreme court was in
line with the majority interpretation of concerted activity when it
analyzed Boggs' claim according to the element or purpose rule.59
The Fourth Circuit logically applied the element or purpose rule to
define Boggs' activity in Krispy Kreme.8 ° The evidence in Krispy Kreme
did not provide the minimal showing of group interest that the element
or purpose rule requires." Indeed, the court had no evidence on which to
base a determination that other employees shared Boggs' concern about
workmen's compensation claim filing rights.2 Had the Krispy Kreme
court been able to find the slightest evidence of group interest, Boggs'
activity could have qualified as a concerted activity since the filing of a
workmen's compensation claim appears to be a legitimate work-related
activity.83
The Fourth Circuit appropriately concluded that the constructive
concerted activity rule was not applicable in a situation in which no col-
lective bargaining agreement exists to serve as the foundation for an in-
ference of group interest.'4 The Krispy Kreme court reasonably rejected
the NLRB's presumption argument on the grounds that the state-
administered statute involved in Boggs' case did not provide a sufficient
v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 1379, 1385 (9th Cir. 1976) (employees who lobbied for retention of im-
migration quotas for foreign engineers engaged in concerted activity even though lobbying
effort involved no request for action on part of employer); note 51 supra.
ISee, e.g., ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713,716-17 (6th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. C & I Air
Conditioning, Inc., 486 F.2d 977,978 (9th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881,
884-85 (3d Cir. 1971). Although the-ARO court discussed the rationale of Interboro, it re-
jected the Interboro or constructive concerted activity rule on the facts of ARO. 596 F.2d at
716-18. A temporary employee, Williams, who obtained her job two weeks before the com-
pany hired a permanent worker complained that she had seniority rights for the permanent
position. Id- at 714. The regular company policy was to discharge temporary employees
before probationary workers. Id. at 715. Williams' complaints did not constitute concerted
activity since the court determined that Williams was acting solely for her benefit. Id. at
718; cf. NLRB v. C & I Air Conditioning, Inc., 486 F.2d 977, 978-79 (9th Cir. 1973) (no con-
certed activity even under collective bargaining agreement because employee did not refer
to agreement in state grievance).
" See text accompanying notes 34-36 & 42-48 supra.
6 See text accompanying notes 34-36 & 41-48 supra.
61 See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra. Courts following the element or purpose
rule decide the question of concerted activity on the basis of the factual setting of each case.
For example, in Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1009, 1017 (3d Cir.
1980), the court found concerted activity when substantial evidence existed that two
discharged employees were acting as spokesmen for other employees. 618 F.2d at 1017; cf.
NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d 1079, 1081-82 (8th Cir. 1977) (employee's verbal opin-
ions about equal pay for women not concerted activity in absence of evidence indicating that
other employees shared her concerns).
62 See text accompanying notes 43-47 supra.
See text accompanying notes 36 & 52 supra; 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678, §§ 651 & 676 (1976)
(Congress approved workmen's compensation system).
"See text accompanying notes 39-41 supra.
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basis for implying group interest on the part of Boggs' fellow employees. 5
The presumption argument might be appropriate, however, in situations
in which the evidence establishes a stronger basis for making an in-
ference of group concern. For example, the presumption argument may
be valid if the evidence of a particular case demonstrates that group in-
terest arose after the employee activity took place or, if the statute pro-
viding the inference of group activity is a federally-legislated provision
affecting employees on a nationwide and uniform basis. In such situa-
tions, a court could expand' the constructive concerted activity rule to
encompass the NLRB's presumption argument. 8
If the Krispy Kreme case had involved a grievance related to a col-
lective bargaining agreement, the Fourth Circuit might have adopted
the constructive concerted activity rule as the logical extension of the
element or purpose rule 7 In future section 7 cases involving collective
bargaining agreements the Fourth Circuit may expand the definition of
concerted activity in accordance with the constructive concerted activity
rule.6 The Fourth Circuit is unlikely to adopt the presumption argument
unless the court has more than a tenuous theoretical presumption upon
which to base an extension of the NLRB's jurisdiction. 9
LEIGH ANN GALBRAITH
See text accompanying notes 51-56 supra. The federal government has sanctioned
workmen's compensation claims in OSHA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678, §§ 651 & 676 (1976), but the
individual state creates and administers the system of workmen's compensation insurance.
Creating and administering a compensation system is each state's responsibility. See W.
DITTMAR, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 8-10 (1959). States vary as to the manner in which the
workmen's compensation claims process, has developed. See McGarry, A New Federal
Remedy for the Protection of Employee Rights, 31 LABOR L.J. 745, 746 (1980).,Ten states
provide employees with a remedy for wrongful discharge in workmen's compensation
claims, either through statute or common law recognition of a cause of action. Id. Arguably,
if all employees share a group interest in securing the right to file workmen's compensation
claims, the states' reactions in providing a remedy for wrongful discharge in compensation
cases would'be more uniform. But see note 52 supra.
See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
See text accompanying note 41 supra. One commentator has discussed the construc-
tive concerted activity rule as an extension of § 7 protection that includes action whose con-
certed nature is implicit rather than explicit. Interboro Split supra note 9, at 159. The con-
structive concerted activity rule, therefore, avoids jeopardizing the rights of an individual
employee acting alone because of a failure to invoke the union's grievance process and to act
in concert in a literal sense. Id. at 160.
"See text accompanying notes 37-40 supra.
See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
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B. NLRB Exclusive Jurisdiction
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) has exclu-
sive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice cases.1 The Board's resolution
of an unfair labor practice dispute preempts any state or federal court
determination of that dispute.2 Federal and state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the Board, however, over collective bargaining contract
cases even if the collective bargaining dispute involves unfair labor prac-
tices.3 To determine for jurisdictional purposes whether a dispute is a
contract dispute or an unfair labor practice, courts look to the conduct
being regulated and not to the formal legal description.4 To avoid incon-
sistent results between Board and court decisions, courts generally
dismiss or stay their proceedings pending the Board's resolution of a
similar dispute.' In Peninsula Shipbuilders' Association v. NLRB," the
Fourth Circuit confronted inconsistent determinations by the NLRB and
I See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Act)
guarantees employees the right to join a labor organization, to bargain collectively, and to
engage in other enumerated activities. Id § 157. The NLRA provides that an employer's in-
terference with the employee's collective bargaining rights under the NLRA is an unfair
labor practice. Id. § 158(a). The NLRA created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB
or the Board) which has power to prevent and remedy unfair labor practices. Id § 160(a).
The NLRA granted to the Board exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice disputes.
I&
2 See San Diego Building Trades, Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959) (state
court jurisdiction must yield to Board's exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practices);
Bova v. Pipefitters & Plumbers Local 60, 554 F.2d 226, 228 (5th Cir. 1977) (Board's exclusive
jurisdiction over unfair labor practices preempts federal court's jurisdiction).
' See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). Congress has delegated to federal courts concurrent
jurisdiction with the Board over contract disputes between an employer and labor organiza-
tion Id. See NLRB v. George E. Light Boat Storage, Inc., 373 F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 1967)
(federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction with Board over contract disputes even if
dispute involves unfair labor practice); Local Union 499 of Int. Bro. of Elec. Workers v. Iowa
Power & Light Co., 224 F. Supp. 731, 736 (S.D. Iowa 1964) (concurrent jurisdiction exists
between Board and federal courts over collective bargaining contract disputes). State courts
also have concurrent jurisdiction with the Board over contract disputes between employer
and labor union. See William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenter District Council, 417 U.S. 12, 16
(1974) (state court has concurrent jurisdiction over collective bargaining dispute involving
unfair labor practice); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1962) (state court
has concurrent jurisdiction over collective bargaining dispute involving unfair labor prac-
tice).
' See Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge,
403 U.S. 274, 292 (1971) (conduct being regulated determines whether state court has con-
current jurisdiction with Board).
' See Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167 F.2d 183, 190-91 (4th Cir.
1948) (federal court action dismissed pending Board's resolution); Sheet Metal Workers Int'l
Ass'n, Local No. 59 v. Employers Ass'n of Roofer & Sheet Metals, Inc., 22 F.R. Serv. 2d 993,
994 (D. Del. 1976) (district court action stayed pending unfair labor practice dispute before
Board); International Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders & Combusion Eng'r Inc., 337
F. Supp. 1349, 1352 (D. Conn. 1971) (Board's motion to stay court action granted in interest
of judicial economy).
1 663 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1981).
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the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia of a
collective bargaining agreement interpretation that involved an unfair
labor practice.
In 1975, the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company
(Newport News Shipbuilding) and the Peninsula Shipbuilders' Associa-
tion (PSA) entered into a collective bargaining agreement covering
Newport News Shipbuilders' 19,000 employees." In January, 1978 the
Newport News Shipbuilding employees voted to replace PSA with the
United Steelworkers Association (Steelworkers) as union bargaining
agents.8 PSA contested the outcome of the election, and the Steel-
workers did not replace PSA as the bargaining agent until October 28,
1978, when the collective bargaining agreement expired.' During the ten
months following the election, Newport News Shipbuilding management
recognized PSA as the employees' bargaining agent and continued to
deduct PSA dues from the paychecks of employees who had authorized
the deductions.10 During the ten month period, 214 employees sent let-
ters to Newport News Shipbuilding to revoke their PSA dues deduction
authorization." When Newport News Shipbuilding informed PSA of its
intention to honor the revocations, PSA threatened to sue Newport
News Shipbuilding for breach of section 23.2 of the collective bargaining
agreement. 2 Section 23.2 of the collective bargaining agreement re-
quired revocations to be on forms furnished by PSA. 3 As a result of
PSA's threat to sue, Newport News Shipbuilding continued to deduct
employees dues and remit dues to PSA.'4 PSA sent certified letters to
the 214 employees who had attempted to revoke their dues deduction
authorizations, informing the employees that under the collective
bargaining agreement employees could use only PSA forms to sitop the
Id. at 489-90. The collective bargaining agreement between PSA and Newport News
Shipbuilding originally expired on June 30, 1978 but was extended until October 28, 1978.
Id at 490.
81&
' Id. In late 1979, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Steelworkers had won the
disputed election to represent Newport News Shipbuildings' employees. See Newport
News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 108, 114 (4th Cir. 1979) (affirming
Board's order that Steelworkers were employee's bargaining agent with Newport News
Shipbuilding).
663 F.2d at 490.
" Id
Id. Section 23.1 of the collective bargaining agreement allowed an employer to
deduct union dues from an employee's pay and pay the deduction to the union provided the
employee voluntarily authorized the deduction in writing. Id at 440 n.2. Section 23.2 of the
collective bargaining agreement provided that the dues deduction authorization of an
employee could end after one year or when the collective bargaining agreement terminated.
Id. at 490 n.3. Section 23.2 of the collective bargaining agreement further required revoca-
tion of the dues deduction authorization be executed on a form furnished by PSA. Id. at 490
n.2.
'3 Id.
'" Id. at 490.
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deduction of union dues.'- Fifty-six employees eventually revoked their
dues on the proper forms."6
Before the PSA contract expired, the Steelworkers filed unfair labor
practices charges against Newport News Shipbuilding and PSA.'7 The
unfair labor practice charges alleged that through enforcement of sec-
tion 23.2 of the collective bargaining agreement both Newport News
Shipbuilding 8 and PSA 9 interfered with the employees' collective
bargaining rights.2 After the Steelworkers filed the Board action,
Newport News Shipbuilding filed a declaratory action against PSA in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.1
The complaint requested that the court construe the collective bargain-
ing agreement to determine the procedures necessary to revoke check-
off authorizations, and to decide whether Newport News Shipbuilding
was entitled to indemnification for any claims that arose out of the ad-
ministration of the collective bargaining agreement.' While the district
court action was pending, the Board issued unfair labor practice com-
plaints against Newport News Shipbuilding and PSA.' The Board then
moved to intervene and stay the district court action pending the out-
come of the unfair labor practice proceeding.24 The district court permit-
ted the Board to participate as amicus curiae, but denied the Board's
motions to intervene and to stay the district court proceeding.' The
district court held that Newport News Shipbuilding could continue
checkoffs hot revoked on PSA forms and that PSA should indemnify




11 Id. The unfair labor practice charges in Peninsula Shipbuilders' asserted that
Newport News Shipbuilding violated the NLRA by interfering with the employees' right to
bargain collectively and by discouraging membership in the Steelworkers. Id.; see 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3) (1976).
" 663 F.2d at 490. The unfair labor charges alleged that PSA violated the NLRA by in-
terfering with the employees' right to bargain collectively and by discouraging membership
in the union. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(1), 158(b)(2) (1976).
663 F.2d at 490.
" Id. at 490-91. Newport News Shipbuilding filed a declaratory action in district court
for judicial construction of section 23.2 of the collective bargaining agreement against PSA,
PSA's business manager, and the 158 employees who attempted to revoke their checkoff
authorizations on non-PSA forms. Id.
I Id. at 491. The collective bargaining agreement between Newport News Ship-
building and PSA required PSA -to indemnify Newport News Shipbuilding against any
claim that arose out of the administration of the agreement. Id. at 491 n.5. Since PSA
agreed to assume any liability from the administration of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, Newport News Shipbuilding did not participate in the Board's unfair labor practice
action against both PSA and Newport News Shipbuilding. Id. at 491.
2 Id. The Board originally dismissed the unfair labor practice charge against PSA. Id.
at 491 n.6. After the Steelworkers successfully appealed the decision of the Board, the
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tion of the collective bargaining agreement.26 The district court did not
decide the lawfulness of section 23.2 of the collective bargaining agree-
ment under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Act), but on-
ly interpreted the requirements of that provision, of the collective
bargaining agreement.' Neither Newport News Shipbuilding nor PSA
appealed the judgment.' The Board, however, appealed to the Fourth
Circuit the district court's denial of intervention.2
Armed with the district court decision, PSA moved to dismiss on res
judicata grounds the unfair labor practice charges before the Board."
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held the district court decision
was not binding on the Board proceedings and refused to dismiss the un-
fair labor practice charges." The ALJ noted that the issue before the
district court was contract interpretation, while the Board's action in-
volved unfair labor practices 2 Furthermore, the ALJ noted that the
parties in the district court action did not represent adequately either
the Board's or Steelworkers' interests. The ALJ concluded that the
district court findings regarding construction of the collective bargain-
ing agreement were not binding on the Board action. 4
The Administrative Law Judge held that both PSA35 and Newport
Id. The 158 employees who attempted to revoke their dues on non-PSA forms were
defendants with PSA in the district court's declaratory action. Id. Because the 158
employees failed to appear in the district court action, the district court found them in
default. Id.
z' Id. Since both PSA and Newport News Shipbuilding agreed that section 23.2 was
lawful, the district court did not decide the lawfulness of section 23.2 under the NLRA. Id.
" See id.
" See Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. Peninsula Shipbuilders' Ass'n,
646 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1981). The Board could appeal the denial of intervention since it was a
final order. Id. at 123. See, e.g., Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386
U.S. 129, 132 (1967) (denial of intervention constitutes final appealable order); County'of
Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1980) (intervening party can appeal denial of
intervention); Corby Recreation, Inc. v. General Elee. Co., 581 F.2d 175, 176 n.1 (8th Cir.
1978) (denial of intervention constitutes final appealable order).
I See Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. United Steelworkers & Penin-
sula Shipbuilders Ass'n, No. JD-403-80, slip op. at 10 (July 10, 1980); note 19 supra.
SI No. JD-403-80, slip op. at 18.
Id., slip op. at 18.
d., slip op. at 18. The Administrative Law Judge speculated that the district court's
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement bound the employees who were named
defendants in the district court action. Id., slip op. at 18. The ALJ stated that the defendant
employees could not bring another suit for interpretation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. Id, slip op. at 18. The Board stated, however, that the district court action bound
neither the Board nor the Steelworkers because neither were parties in the district court
action. Id., slip op. at 18.
Id, slip op. at 18.
Id., slip op. at 26. The Administrative Law Judge held that PSA committed an un-
fair labor practice by interfering with employees' collective bargaining rights through en-
forcement of section 23.2 of the collective bargaining agreement. Id., slip op. at 26. The
manifestations of the violations occurred when PSA told Newport News Shipbuilding to
continue the checkoff and when PSA received and retained the dues of employees who at-
tempted to revoke PSA dues checkoffs on non-PSA forms. Id, slip op. at 26.
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News Shipbuilding" had committed unfair labor practices. 7 The ALJ
concluded that section 23.2 of the collective bargaining agreement
violated subsection 302(c)(4) of the NLRA since the agreement required
employees to go beyond the requirements of the NLRA by permitting
revocation of dues checkoffs only on PSA forms.' The ALJ relied on
Felter v. Southern Pacific Co. 9 to protect employees from employer-
union agreements that limit a union member's ability to revoke the dues
checkoff authorization.40 In Felter, the Supreme Court held that a
checkoff provision similar to section 23.2 violated the Railway Labor Act
because the provision restricted individual employee's freedom to
revoke the dues checkoff.41 The ALJ concluded that Felter controlled the
Peninsula Shipbuilders' case since section 23.2 curtailed the right of in-
dividual employees to revoke their dues.42 The Administrative Law
I d., slip op. at 26. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Newport News
Shipbuilding committed unfair labor practices by interfering with employees' collective
bargaining rights through enforcement of section 23.2 of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. IM, slip op. at 26. Newport News Shipbuilding's violations consisted of restricting
employees from exercising their checkoff rights and continuing to checkoff union dues to
PSA after receiving unambiguous revocations of dues checkoff authorizations from the con-
cerned employees. Id., slip op. at 26.
Id., slip op. at 26.
IM, slip op. at 19. Both the NLRA and the collective bargaining agreement between
PSA and Newport News Shipbuilding permitted employees to revoke their dues deduction
authorizations after one year or when the collective bargaining agreement terminated. See
29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4) (1976); note 12 supra. Section 23.2, however, required revocation of dues
deduction authorizations to be on forms provided by PSA. See note 12 supra.
" 359 U.S. 326 (1959). In Felter v. Southern Pacific Co., a dues deduction agreement
between a union and an employer stated that the union's form was the only valid form for
revoking dues checkoffs. See idc at 327. A union member challenged the contractual regula-
tion as a violation of the statutory right to revoke the assignment of dues deductions. Id. at
328. The union member notified the union that he was revoking the authorization to
checkoff his dues and sent a revocation form to the employer. Id. The union and the
employer declined to revoke the dues checkoff, although the employee had used a form iden-
tical to the union forms. IM at 328-29. The Supreme Court held that the dues deduction
agreement violated the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152(11)(b) (1976). 359 U.S. at 330. The
Court held that the authority to checkoff dues does not include the authority to bind the in-
dividual employees to the checkoff. Id.
Id., slip op. at 20.
41 359 U.S. at 330. The Railway Labor Act permits an employee to revoke his dues
checkoff authorization after one year or when the collective bargaining agreement ter-
minates. 45 U.S.C. § 152(11)(b) (1976). The Act also permits revocation of dues deduction
authorization in the same manner as the National Labor Relations Act. Id.; see note 36
supra. In Felter v. Southern Pacific Co., the Supreme Court found a violation of the Railway
Labor Act's procedure for revocation of dues deduction authorization when the union made
the employee revoke his checkoff authorization on a union form. 359 U.S. at 334. Similarly,
the Administrative Law Judge in Peninsula Shipbuilders'found a violation of the NLRA's
procedure for revocation of dues deduction authorizations when PSA required employees to
revoke checkoff authorizations on PSA forms. No. JD-403-80, slip op. at 21, 22.
" No. JD-403-80, slip op. at 22. The Administrative Law Judge held that section 23.2 of
the collective bargaining agreement constituted an unfair labor practice because section
23.2 required employees to revoke their dues deduction authroizations on PSA forms. Id,
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Judge held, therefore, Newport News Shipbuilding and PSA jointly and
severally liable to reimburse employees who had revoked checkoff
authorizations on non-PSA forms.43 The ALJ ordered" PSA and
Newport News Shipbuilding to discontinue the iquirement that revoca-
tion of dues checkoffs be on PSA forms."
After the Board found that PSA and Newport News Shipbuilding
had committed unfair labor practices, the Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court and held the Board had a right to intervene in the district
court action."' The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Board's jurisdiction
slip op. at 22. The ALJ held alternatively tliat section 23.2 of the collective bargaining
agreement was unlawful as applied, since PSA imposed further restrictions on employees.
beyond the requirement that employees use PSA forms to revoke dues deduction authoriza-
tions. Id, slip op. at 22. First, the ALJ observed the absence of convenient access to PSA
forms. Id., slip op. at 23. Secondly, the ALJ noted that employees had no formal notice of
proper checkoff procedures. Id, slip op. at 23. Finally, the ALJ emphasized that employees
could exercise the right to revoke only through personal appearance at the PSA hall. Id,
slip op. at 23. The Administrative Law Judge surmised that requiring employees to ter-
minate the dues checkoff at the union headquarters constituted an unconscionable impedi-
ment to the employees' exercise of the right to revoke. Id, slip op. at 23. PSA's history of
abuses towards employees who did not support PSA reinforced the ALJ's conclusions. Id,
slip op. at 24. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 236 NLRB No. 202, 1499,
1508-509 (1978) (unfair labor practices found against PSA and Newport News Shipbuilding
for various acts of coercion against employee supporters of Steelworkers). The ALJ con-
cluded that Newport News Shipbuilding was equally as responsible as PSA for the unfair
libor practice convictions since Newport News Shipbuilding delegated to PSA responsibility
for distributing the revocation forms. No. JD-403-80, slip op. at 23.
No. JD-403-80, slip op. at 26.
" Id, slip op. at 26. The Administrative Law Judge's order that PSA and Newport
News Shipbuilding discontinue the requirement that revocation of dues checkoffs be on
PSA forms was moot since PSA no longer was the employees' collective bargaining agent.
Id., slip op. at 27.
1 Id., slip op. at 27. The Board issued an enforcement order affirming the Administra-
tive Law Judge's determination that PSA and Newport News Shipbuilding committed un-
fair labor practices. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 253 NLRB No.
96,721-22 (1980).
" See Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. Peninsula Shipbuilders' Ass'n &
NLRB, 646 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1981). To intervene by right an applicant must make a timely
application and have an interest in the action. FED. RULE Civ. P. 24(a). In addition, the appli-
cant must have an interest that will be impaired by disposition of the action in the
applicant's absence, and the applicant's interst must be inadequately represented. Id The
Fourth Circuit found that the district court's denial of Board intervention impaired the
Board's interest in the district court action. 646 F.2d at 121. Even though the district court
action did not bar the unfair labor practice hearing before the Board, the Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that the denial of intervention created a "practical disadvantage" for the Board. 646
F.2d at 121, quoting Neusse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The Fourth Circuit
found that the Board's status as amicus.curiae in the district court action did not safeguard
adequately the Board's interest. 646 F.2d at 121-22. The Fourth Circuit noted that the
district court's refusal to allow the Board to demonstrate that section 23.2 was an unfair
labor practice on the ground that the Board lacked party status illustrated the inadequacy
of amicus curiae standing. Id. Further, the Fourth Circuit noted the Board could not appeal
the district court decision because the Board was not a party to the action. Id. An applicant
for intervention may have an impaired interest even though the court decision is not bin-
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over the subject matter of unfair labor practices constituted a sufficient
interest to allow the Board to intervene.1 The court noted that the pro-
ceeding before the Board involved the same issues as in the district
court suit, and that denial of intervention could result in inconsistent in-
terpretations of section 23.2 of the collective bargaining agreement.
The Fourth Circuit noted that the primary concern of both parties in the
district court action was to fix ultimate financial liability resulting from
the Board proceeding.49 The Fourth Circuit did not decide whether the
district court had jurisdiction over the collective bargaining dispute, but
did question whether the declaratory action before the district court
constituted a live justiciable controversy since the collective bargaining
agreement had expired." After allowing intervention, the Fourth Circuit
permitted the Board to appeal all findings of the district court. 1 The
Board, using the status of intervenor on appeal, appealed the determina-
tions of the district court to the Fourth Circuit.2 PSA petitioned the
Fourth Circuit to set aside the Board's enforcement order, and the Board
ding on the applicant. See Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 825 (5th Cir.
1967) (court decision does not have to bind party to permit intervention). The primary
weakness of amicus curiae status is lack of standing to appeal. See Neusse v. Camp, 385
F.2d 694, 704 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (important characteristic of amicus curiae is lack of right
to appeal).
The requirement of inadequate representation is met if the applicant shows the
possibility of inadequate representation, and the burden of making the showing is minimal.
See Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972). The Fourth Circuit found that the
Board's interest was inadequately represented. 646 F.2d at 122. The Fourth Circuit noted
that both Newport News Shipbuilding and PSA were aligned against the Board. Id Fur-
thermore, the 158 individual defendants did not have any incentive to represent the Board's
interests. Id
"? 646 F.2d at 121; see Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167 F.2d 183,
185 (4th Cir. 1948) (Board has sufficient jurisdictional interest in unfair labor practices to
permit intervention); International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 337 F.
Supp. 1349, 1351 (D. Conn. 1972) (Board's jurisdictional interest sufficient to permit in-
tervention).
646 F.2d at 120-21.
" Id The district court held that PSA would indemnify Newport News Shipbuilding
for any liability from administration of section 23.2 of the collective bargaining agreement.
Id. at 120.
' Id at 121. An actual controversy must exist for a federal court to issue a declaratory
judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Smith v. DCA Food Indus., Inc., 269 F.
Supp. 863, 867-68 (D. Md. 1967) (assertion of federal court jurisdiction requires existence of
actual controversy).
51 646 F.2d at 122-23. An intervenor can appeal a determination of the court that affects
the intervenor's interest. See Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (appeal
limited to intervenor's interest in proceeding). The Board had sufficient jurisdictional in-
terest to appeal the district court's assumption of jurisdiction, refusal to stay the pro-
ceedings, and the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. 646 F.2d at 122-23;
see text accompanying note 1 supra.
'52 See Peninsula Shipbuilders' Ass'n v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 488, 489 (4th Cir. 1981).
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cross-applied for enforcement of the order against, PSA.53 The Board fur-
ther applied for enforcement of the Board's order against Newport News
Shipbuilding.54 The Fourth Circuit consolidated the three actions on ap-
peal.
55
The Fourth Circuit held that because the Board had exclusive juris-
diction over the unfair labor practice actions, the Board's conclusion that
section 23.2 of the collective bargaining agreement constituted an unfair
labor practice preempted the district court's determination that section
23.2 was lawful.5 6 Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district
court's findings were invalid to the extent they conflicted with the
Board's determinations.57 The Fourth Circuit noted that the indemnifica-
tion issue presented a live controversy for the district court" and that
the district court had concurrent jurisdiction with the Board over con-
tract disputes.59 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit found the district
court's jurisdiction subordinate to the Board's exclusive jurisdiction
over unfair labor practice actions. 0 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the
district court should have stayed its proceedings pending the outcome of
the Board action." The Fourth Circuit did'not find, however, that the
failure to stay the proceedings was an abuse of discretion.2 Accordingly,
the Fourth Circuit did not vacate the district court's holding, but merely
held the district court decision invalid where inconsistent with the
Board's decision.6
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the Board's determination that ap-
plication of section 23.2 of the collective bargaining agreement was
unlawful under the National Labor Relations Act."' The Fourth Circuit
Id. The Board can petition federal circuit courts for enforcement of the Board's
order. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976). Any aggrieved party can appeal the Board's enforcement
order. Id. § 160(f). Thus, both PSA and the Board appealed the Board decision to the Fourth





Id. at 494 n.9. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the issue created an actual con-
troversy noting the district court determination that PSA would indemnify and defend
Newport News Shipbuilding for any liability arising from administration of section 23.2 of
the collective bargaining agreement. Id.; see note 50 supra.
5, 663 F.2d at 494 n.19.
® Id at 492.
Id at 494. n.9.
Id.; see Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248,254-55 (1936) (power to stay pro-
ceedings is within court's discretion).
663 F.2d at 493-94.
' Id. at 492-93. The Fourth Circuit did not address the issue whether the procedure
for dues deduction in the collective bargaining agreement was an unfair labor practice on its
face. Id. The Board has stated that a violation of section 302(c)(4) of the NLRA cannot itself
constitute an unfair labor practice. See note 38 supra. See, e.g., In re Salant & Salant, Inc.,
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noted that employees did not have easy access to PSA forms." The court
observed that before 1978 employees had no information regarding the
manner of revoking dues checkoff authorizations except through the
clause in section 23.2 which required the use of a PSA form.6 Finally, the
Fourth Circuit noted that employees had to appear personally at the
PSA hall to sign the proper forms." While the Fourth Circuit found no
evidence of harassment at the PSA office, the court asserted that the ad-
ditional requirement of appearance at the PSA office could restrict the
employees' freedom to revoke union dues. 8 The Fourth Circuit conclud-
ed that the Board properly applied section 23.2 and affirmed the Board's
order requiring PSA and Newport News Shipbuilding to reimburse
employees who had attempted to revoke dues deductions on non-PSA
forms.69
In Peninsula Shipbuilders' Association v. NLRB, the Fourth Circuit
addressed a lawsuit that had inconsistent interpretations of a collective
bargaining agreement as a consequence of the district court's failure to
recognize the Board's role as primary arbiter of labor disputes.7 0 The
district court should not have asserted jurisdiction since the collective
bargaining agreement had expired. 7' Furthermore, the district court did
not have to interpret the indemnification and defense sections of the col-
lective bargaining agreement since PSA already had agreed to indem-
nify and defend Newport News Shipbuilding for any liability that arose
from administration of the collective bargaining agreement.7 2 No actual
88 NLRB 816, 817-18 (1950) (§ 302 of NLRA has enforcement provisions and violation
thereof cannot be per se unfair labor practice). But see NLRB v. Atlanta Printing
Specialties & Paper Prod. Union, 523 F.2d 783, 784-85 (5th Cir. 1975) (in face of valid revoca-
tion, employer's continued checkoff is unfair labor practice); NLRB v. Penn Cork &
Closures, Inc., 376 F.2d 52, 55 (2nd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 843 (1967) (penalties con-
tained within § 302 do not immunize section from unfair labor practice scrutiny).
'3 663 F.2d at 492-93.
68 Id.
67 Id.
" Id. at 493. PSA argued that the difficulty employees experienced in revoking their
dues checkoffs resulted from PSA's concern about the authenticity of the revocation
signatures. Id. The Fourth Circuit rejected PSA's argument and stated that PSA should
have consulted informally with the employees if PSA was concerned with the autenticity of
the signatures. Id., quoting Felter v. Southern Pacific Co., 359 U.S. 326, 335 (1958).
663 F.2d at 493-94.
70 See note 1 supra.
u 663 F.2d at 490-91. Newport News Shipbuilding brought the declaratory action on
November 16, 1978 and the collective bargaining agreement expired on October 28, 1978. Id.
No actual controversy was before the.court since the contract had expired. See Mackay v.
Loew's Inc., 84 F. Supp. 676, 677 (S.D. Cal. 1949) (employee cannot bring declaratory action
if collective bargaining agreement has expired). The Fourth Circuit in Peninsula Ship-
builders' stated that a live controversy was before the district court over indemnification
but the Fourth Circuit enforced the Board's decision which did not permit PSA to indemnify
Newport News Shipbuilding. 663 F.2d at 492-93.
"' See note 22 supra.
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controversy was before the district court because the real reason
Newport News Shipbuilding brought the declaratory action was to ab-
solve itself from any liability before the Board.73 Thus, the district court
should have stayed or dismissed its proceedings pending the outcome of
the Board dispute. 4 Since the district court failed to stay or dismiss its
proceedings, the Fourth Circuit permitted the Board to intervene to
render appealable all determinations of the district court.75
* Once the Board appealed the district court action, the Fourth Circuit
correctly deferred to the Board's determinations." Although the Board
did not dismiss explicitly the district court decision, the effect of the
Fourth Circuit's preemption remedy was dismissal of the district court
findings." The district court held that section 23.2 was lawful,78 but the
Board held that section 23.2 constituted an unfair labor practice. The
district court held that PSA should indemnify Newport News Ship-
building,0 but the Board held PSA and Newport News Shipbuilding
jointly and severally liable to the employees. 1 As a consequence of the
Fourth Circuit's deference to the Board's determinations on both the
section 23.2 and indemnity issues, the district court decision was prac-
tically dismissed.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Peninsula Shipbuilders' limits
federal court concurrent jurisdiction over collective bargaining contract
disputes. By stating that the district court should have stayed its pro-
ceedings,82 the Fourth Circuit determined that the Board had exclusive
jurisdiction over section 23.2 of the collective bargaining agreement
since it involved unfair labor practices. 3 Although the Fourth Circuit's
decision fails to establish when a court should stay its proceedings pend-
ing the Board's determination,84 courts will certainly have to stay or
dismiss their proceedings once the Board takes subsequent jurisdiction
over the same contract provisions. Thus, a federal court has concurrent
jurisdiction over a contract dispute provided the Board does not ad-
judicate subsequent unfair labor charges over the same contract provi-
sions.
In Peninsula Shipbuilders, the Fourth Circuit correctly recognized
that PSA and Newport News Shipbuilding committed unfair labor prac-
, 649 F.2d at 120-21; see notes 22 & 50 supra.
" See text accompanying note 5 supra.
, See text accompanying note 51 supra.
" 663 F.2d at 492-93.
w See id
Id at 492.
,9 Id See notes 35 & 36 supra.
' See text accompanying note 26 supra.
" See text accompanying note 43 supra.
663 F.2d at 494 n.9.
SId. at 492.
" Id at 494 n.9.
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tices by enforcing section 23.2 of the collective bargaining agreement.85
The Board's findings of fact demonstrated that PSA and Newport News
Shipbuilding interfered with employees' right to revoke dues checkoffs.88
Although the Fourth Circuit did not decide whether section 23.2 was
unlawful on its face,7 the Fourth Circuit penalized PSA and Newport
News Shipbuilding for their unlawful application of section 23.2 to
Newport News Shipbuilders' employees.", Thus, by deferring to the
Board's determinations, the Fourth Circuit protected employees from
the unlawful practices of their union and employer.
JOHN PALMER FISHWICK, JR.
C. Section 2(3) of the NLRA and the "Right to Control" Test
Section 2(3) of The National Labor Relations Act (Act),' as amended
by The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA),2 excludes in-
dependent contractors from coverage under the Act.' Congress did not
define the term "independent contractor" in the Act, but intended
the exclusion to codify the common-law distinction between indepen-
dent contractors 'and employees.' Prior to the 1947 amendment to the
See text accompanying notes 64-68 supra.
" See note 42 supra; Congress has stated that the Board's findings of fact are con-
clusive if supported by substantial evidence. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976); see Community Hosp.
of Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 607, 609-10 (4th Cir. 1976) (Board's findings of fact
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence).
See note 64 supra.
See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
Pub. L. No. 101, § 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976). Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act) now
defines the term "employee" as any employee; not merely the employees of a particular
employer. Id The Act excludes from the term "employee" any individual having the status
of independent contractor, anyone employed as an agricultural laborer, domestic servant, or
supervisor, anyone employed by a parent or spouse, anyone employed by an employer sub-
ject to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1976), and anyone employed by someone not
an employer within the meaning of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
' 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976); see note 3 supra (Act's definition of employee). The Act
does not clarify the meaning of the term "independent contractor."
NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968) (obvious congressional pur-
pose in amending act to have courts and NLRB use agency principles to distinguish be-
tween employees and independent contractors); Local 777, Democratic Union Organizing
Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (NLRB and courts must avoid tendency
to expand meaning of term "employee" beyond limits set by common-law agency principles);
see note 7 infra (legislative history of Act).
The common law recognized a distinction between independent contractors and
employees that derived from the amount of control the master reserved over the
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Act," the National Labor Relations Board (Board, NLRB) acted with the
United States Supreme Court's sanction in interpreting the term
"employee" expansively.' The Supreme Court interpreted section 2(3) of
the amended Act to require the NLRB and reviewing courts to apply
common-law agency principles to distinguish employees from indepen-
dent contractors on a case by case basis.8 Courts have developed the
individual's conduct in performing the required services. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGEN-
cy § 220(1) (1957). The nature of the relationship between master and servant, though not
precisely definable, determined the master's potential liability to third parties for the acts
of his servant. Id., Comment c at 486. Thus, while a master would be liable for injuries aris-
ing out of the negligent conduct of a servant in performing his duties, the master would not
be liable for the negligence of an independent contractor. Id., Comment e at 487-88. An indi-
vidual rendering service but retaining control over the manner of performance would be an
independent contractor not a servant. Id. at 488. Factors indicating a master-servant rela-
tionship included close supervision, unskilled labor, use of tools that the master supplied,
payment by the hour or month, long-term employment with regular hours, full-time employ-
ment by one employer, work done -constituting part of the employer's regular business, the
belief of the parties concerning the nature of the relationship, and an agreement limiting
delegation of the duties agreed upon. Id. § 220(2) & Comment h at 489.
6 Pub. L. No. 101, § 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), now codified as 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1976).
Prior to the 1947 amendment, the Act defined "employee" in the same way as the current
Act, see note 3 supra, except that the term "employee" excluded from coverage under the
Act only agricultural laborers, domestic servants, and employees of parents or spouse. Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, § 2(3), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)
(1976)).
" See, e.g., Stockholder's Publishing Co., 28 N.L.R.B. 1006, 1023 n.33 (1941) (in deter-
mining employment status under Act, primary consideration is whether policies and pur-
poses of Act justify granting individual in question rights and protection Act guarantees);
Seattle Poit-Intelligence Dept. of Hearst Publications, Inc., 9 N.L.R.B. 1262, 1274-75 (1938)
(public policy requires broad interpretation of employment status pursuant to Act). See also
NLRB v. E. C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 403 (1947) (Board not confined to technical or
common-law definition of employee, but may examine relevant economic and statutory con-
siderations since Congress did not define term); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S.
111, 124, 127-29 (1944) (policy considerations, legislative intent, and economic realities of
employment relations relevant to determination of employee or independent contractor
status); NLRB v. Gluek Brewing Co., 144 F.2d 847, 855 (8th Cir. 1944) (common-law defini-
tions of employment relationships must yield to more inclusive definitions to effectuate pur-
pose of Act). But see H. R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in [1947] I
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 309 (criticizing
Hearst Court for expanding meaning of term "employee" and ignoring customary legal
distinction between independent contractor and employee).
NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256, 258 (1968). The United Insurance
Court examined the employment relationship between the company and the debit agents
that collected premiums, sold new insurance, and kept old policies from lapsing for the com-
pany. Id. at 255. The Court weighed all the incidents of the relatidnship, listing numerous
factors relevant to the determination that the debit agents were employees of the insurance
company. Id. at 258. The Court noted that the agents were essential to the company's ordi-
nary operations and did business in the company's name, that company personnel trained
the agents and assisted them in performing their jobs, and that the agents sold only com-
pany insurance policies. Id. Other factors the Court mentioned were that the agents
regularly reported the funds they collected to the company under a procedure the company
developed, that the company unilaterally set the conditions and terms of employment, that
the agents participated in the company's benefit plans, and that the company had issued a
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right to control test from common-law agency principles to determine an
individual's employment status under section 2(3) of the Act.9 In apply-
ing the right to control test, courts and the Board examine the nature of
the control the putative employer exerts over the disputed individual's
performance by analyzing all elements of the employment relationship."
If the employer controls the manner and means of the putative
employee's performance, the individual is an employee within the mean-
ing of section 2(3).11 If the employer simply assigns the task and accepts
or rejects the end product, the individual is an independent contractor. 2
Government regulation of employers may complicate assessment of
the degree of control present in an employment relationship.13 Federal
regulation of the trucking industry affects application of the right to con-
policy statement asserting that debit agents could not operate except by complying with
company procedures. Id. at 258-59. The United Insurance Court emphasized that no single
factor was decisive in the determination of the debit agents' status. Id. at 258. The court
must assess the entire factual context of the employment relationship. Id.
' The Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits consider
the right to control test determinative of an individual's employment status. See note 81
infra. The First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits consider other factors in addition to the right to
control test. See note 82 infra. See also T. KHEEL, 2 LABOR LAW §§ 8.02[4][a] & 8.02[5][b][iv]
(1981).
10 See, e.g., NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 606 F.2d 379, 382 (3d Cir. 1979); Local 777,
Democratic Union Organizing Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 873-74 (D.C. Cir. 1978); NLRB
v. Warner, 587 F.2d 896, 899 (8th Cir. 1978); Lorenz Schneider Co. v. NLRB, 517 F.2d 445,
449 (2d Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Cement Transp. Inc., 490 F.2d 1024, 1027 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 828 (1974); NLRB v. A. S. Abell Co., 327 F.2d 1, 4-5 (4th Cir. 1964); Continental Bus
Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 267, 271 (10th Cir. 1963); Mitchell Bros. Trucklines, 249
N.L.R.B. 476, 479-80 (1980).
11 NLRB v. Maine Caterers, Inc., 654 F.2d 131, 133-34 (1st Cir. 1981) (employer's right
to control means of job performance requires enforcement of Board order stating that
drivers are employees); Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 506 F.2d 596, 598-99 (1st Cir. 1974)
(employer's right to control manner of performing services indicates employee status); Stan-
dard Oil Co., 230 N.LR.B. 967, 968 (1977) (factors indicating that employer controlled manner
and means of performance outweigh factors indicating independent contractor status); John
Himmer Transfer, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 284, 285 (1975) (factors indicating extensive employer
control over owner-operators demonstrate employee not independent contractor despite
some factors showing degree of freedom in performing duties).
2 See NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 606 F.2d 379, 385 (3d Cir. 1979) (company's lack of
control over details of owner-operator's performance indicates independent contractor
status); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. NLRB, 385 F.2d 180, 184 (7th Cir. 1967) (failure to distinguish be-
tween employer's control over result sought and control over manner and means of perfor-
mance is basis of erroneous Board decision granting distributors status as employees);
George Transfer & Rigging Co., 208 N.L.R.B. 494, 496 (1974) (employer-employee relation-
ship not established when employer's control extends "solely" to results sought) (emphasis
in original); Portage Transfer Co., 204 N.L.R.B. 787, 788 (1973) (when employer exercised
control only over matters relating to results sought, no employer-employee relationship
established).
13 Local 814, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 564, 568-69 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (Bazeion, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818 (1977); Tri-State Transp. Corp., 245
N.L.R.B. 1030, 1032 (1979).
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trol test because the regulations establish minimum levels of employer
control over leased vehicles and the drivers operating those vehicles.'
Courts applying the right to control test in a regulated industry must
determine whether to consider indicia of employer control arising out of
government regulations. 5
In NLRB v. Tni-State Transportation Corp.,16 the Fourth Circuit
reviewed the status of a non-owner driver of a leased vehicle in the
heavily regulated trucking industry." Tri-State Transportation Corp.
(Tri-State), a West Virginia contract pipe carrier, operates under an In-
terstate Commerce Commission (ICC) certificate of public convenience
and necessity. 8 To increase the company's hauling capacity,.Tri-State's
president executed and signed a lease agreement with Violet Coss,
whose husband Joseph D. Coss was the owner and actual lessor of the
trucking equipment. 9 Cunningham, an intermittent driver of Coss's leased
vehicles, possessed a power of attorney from the hospitalized Coss and
assisted Mrs. Coss in the negotiations leading to an agreement covering
one truck and driver.0
The lease agreement set out each party's responsibilities.2' Pursuant
to applicable ICC regulations, lessor Coss's responsibilities included
license fees, fines and penalites arising out of the rig's unlawful
operations, maintenance costs, and liability insurance on the rig itself."
In conforming with ICC regulations, lessee Tri-State assumed respon-
sibility for liability insurance for damage to the cargo or the public." The
lease absolved lessee Tri-State from responsibility for the driver of the
,1 NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 606 F.2d 379, 383 (3d Cir. 1979). The objects of federal
regulation of the trucking industry are to promote highway safety and ensure financial
responsibility so that losses do not go uncompensated. White v. Excalibur Ins. Co., 599 F.2d
50, 53-54 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 965 (1979); NLRB v. Deaton, Inc., 502 F.2d 1221,
1224-25 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1047 (1975). Thus, the regulations protect both
the general public and the industry's consumers.
"1 See NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 606 F.2d 379, 383 (3d Cir. 1979) (federal regulations
help shape relationship between owner-operator and company); Ace Doran Hauling & Rig-
ging Co. v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 190, 194 (6th Cir. 1972) (court must consider controls arising out
of compliance with federal regulations in conjunction with additional employer controls in
assessing nature of employment relationship); Mitchell Bros. Truck Lines, 249 N.L.R.B. 476,
477, 480 (1980) (state and federal regulations dictate much of employment relationship be-
tween employer and owner-operators).
II 649 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 995.
,I Id The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) has statutory authority and discre-
tion to issue certificates of public necessity and convenience authorizing a motor carrier to
engage in interstate transportation. 49 U.S.C. § 10922 (1976 & 1978 Supp. II). No person
lacking the appropriate certificate may engage in interstate transportation. Id. § 10921.
649 F.2d at 995.
Id. at 995-96.
2 Id. at 996; see notes 48 & .52 infra (impact of ICC regulations on lease).
649 F.2d at 996.
2 Id.
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leased vehicle and denied the driver status as a Tri-State employee.24
Tri-State paid Coss seventy-five percent of the gross receipts that the
leased vehicle generated, and Coss apparently paid Cunningham twenty-
five percent of that amount.' Tri-State did not withhold tax, social
security, or other payroll deductions from Cunningham's pay check,
although Tri-State did make deductions for the drivers the company con-
ceded had employee status." At Coss's request, Tri-State issued the first
four checks payable to Cunningham, although Tri-State made subse-
quent payments directly to Coss when he requested the company do so.'
The working relationship that developed between Cunningham, Coss,
and Tri-State indicated that both Coss and Tri-State directed Cunning-
ham's performance as a driver.28 Tri-State dispatched Cunningham
directly when he called in for assignments, but used Coss as an inter-
mediary when Cunningham did not check in.29 When Cunningham and
Tri-State's president disagreed over a particular assignment, Coss parti-
cipated in the resolution of the dispute."
When Cunningham refused to cross a picket line of striking Tri-
State drivers,"' Tri-State's president notified Coss that Tri-State was
cancelling the lease on the rig that Cunningham drove.2 Cunningham
asserted that since he was a Tri-State employee within the meaning of
the Act, Cunningham's discharge through the president's cancellation of
the lease constituted an unfair labor practice." At the hearing before the
Administrative Law Judge (AL), 34 Tri-State conceded that if Cunning-
Id. at 995 n.2.
Id. at 996 & 996 n.3.
Id. at 996. Coss provided Cunningham with fringe benefits. Brief for Petitioner at 9,
NLRB v. Tri-State Transp. Corp., 649 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for
Petitioner].
649 F.2d at 996.
23 Id.
29 Id.
11 Brief for Respondent at 4, NLRB v. Tri-State Transp. Corp., 649 F.2d 993 (4th Cir.
1981).
Tri-State Transp. Corp., 245 N.L.R.B. 1030, 1032 (1979).
649 F.2d at 997. Tri-State's president terminated the lease the same day Cunn-
ingham refused to cross the picket line. 245 N.L.R.B. at 1032.
' 245 N.L.R.B. at 1030. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act prohibits employer discrimination
against employees participating in union activities for the mutual aid and protection of
other employees. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976); see note 3 supra (definition of employee under
Act).
The complaint alleged that Tri-State unlawfully had dismissed five employees for par-
ticipation in protected activities. 245 N.L.R.B. at 1030. Tri-State settled the cases of the
other four employees prior to the opening hearing in Cunningham's case. Brief for Peti-
tioner, supra note 26, at 2.
649 F.2d at 994. According to the Board procedure, the General Counsel for the
NLRB issues a complaint against an employer upon receipt of a formal charge against an
employer or labor union. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976). See generally A. Cox, D. BOK, & R. GoR-
MAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 105 (9th ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Cox]. Any
person, employer, or qualified labor organization in the office for the region in which the
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ham had been a Tri-State employee the discharge of Cunningham would
violate section 8(a)(1) of the Act 35 protecting concerted activities.36 The
Board, on review, concluded that the employment relationship between
Tri-State and Cunningham determined the outcome of the unfair labor
practices charge against Tri-State. 7 The Board adopted the AL's deci-
sion that Cunningham was an employee within section 2(3) of the Act,
thereby affirming that Tri-State had violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3 8
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Board that the nature of
the employment relationship between Cunningham and Tri-State deter-
mined the outcome of the unfair labor practices charge.39 The Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed the Board, however, holding that the evidence as a whole
would not support a finding that Cunningham was a Tri-State
employee."
In reversing, the Fourth Circuit briefly discussed the standard
governing appellate review of NLRB decisions."' The Fourth Circuit an-
nounced an intention to follow the standard of review the Supreme
Court promulgated in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB." The Universal
alleged unfair labor practice occurred may file a charge within six months of the offense. 29
U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976); Cox, supra, at 105. A Board field examiner investigates the allega-
tions to determine the validity of the charge. Cox, supra, at 105. If the NLRB does not drop
charges, the Board usually will encourage settlement of the dispute in informal conferences
in the local office. Id. Most unfair labor practice charges are settled at informal conferences.
Id. at 106.
If the Board does not drop the charges, the next step is formal proceedings before an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Id. at 107. At the hearing, both parties may introduce
evidence, submit written briefs in support of their positions, and make oral arguments,
although the last is uncommon. Id. at 108. The ALJ prepares a decision containing proposed
findings of fact and recommendations for the Board. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). The Board
usually-adopts the ALJ's findings unless one or more of the parties files an exception to the
proposed findings. Cox, supra, at 108. After reviewing any exceptions and supporting
briefs, if filed, the Board issues an opinion and order. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). Since Board
orders are not self-enforcing, the Board must seek enforcement against a non-complying
party by filing a petition for enforcement in the federal court of appeals in the circuit in
which the unfair labor practice occurred. Id. § 160(e). Any person aggrieved by a final Board
order granting or denying relief in whole or in part may obtain review of the order in the
appeals court in the circuit in which the unfair labor practice occurred, the circuit in which
the respondent does business, or in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Id. § 160(f).
1 245 N.L.R.B. at 1030.
3 Id.; see note 33 supra.
245 N.L.R.B. at 1030.
Id. at 1032.
' 649 F.2d at 994.
'o Id. at 997.
" Id. at 995.
42 Id. at 994; see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). The Universal
Court reversed the Second Circuit on the standard of review an appellate court should
apply to an appeal of an NLRB decision regarding an unfair labor practice under § 8(a) of the
Act. Id. at 490. The Supreme Court identified as error the Second Circuit's refusal to ex-
amine part of the record merely because isolated portions of the record supported the
Board's decision. Id. at 492.
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Court held that unless the evidence in the record as a whole, including
evidence detracting from the Board's findings, substantiates the Board's
decision, an appellate court may overrule that decision. 3 The Universal
Court, however, emphasized that courts must uphold Board decisions
when the evidence indicates that the Board chose "between two fairly
conflicting views."" The Board's decision regarding Cunningham's em-
ployment status required the application of common-law principles to
the Board's factual findings.45 Tri-State did not raise issues requiring the
Board to apply its special expertise. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit
recognized the duty to defer to the Board if the Board chose between
two fairly conflicting views."
The Fourth Circuit scrutinized the employment relationship be-
tween Tri-State and Cunningham in applying the right to control test to
evaluate Cunningham's status.47 The court noted that federal regulations
complicate the application of the right to control test in the trucking in-
dustry by requiring carriers to exert some indicia of control over non-
owner drivers of leased equipment.48 The Fourth Circuit discerned from
case law a standard for evaluating the effect of federal regulations on
assessment of an employer's right to control the details of a putative
employee's performance. 9 The standard that the court applied required
a determination of whether the carrier imposed a significant layer of
regulations on the individual's job performance beyond what federal
regulations mandate."
The Fourth Circuit found a variety of factors relevant to assessing
the nature of the control Tri-State exercised over Cunningham. The
" 340 U.S. at 497. The Universal Court reasoned that § 10(e) of the Act, as amended by
the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), see note 2 supra, in 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)
(1976), requires appellate courts to apply the substantial evidence test to Board decisions.
340 U.S. at 477. The Board's findings of fact are conclusive only if substantial evidence in
the record as a whole supports those findings. Id. at 487. The kind of scrutiny Congress in-
tended appellate courts to apply to Board decisions precludes courts from judging the suffi-
ciency of supporting evidence without also considering the contradictory or potentially con-
tradictory evidence available to the reviewing courts. Id. at 487-88. Courts must consider all
probative evidence that appears credible, even if the Board discounted some or all of the
evidence. Id. at 495-97.
:4 340 U.S. at 488.
'5 649 F.2d at 995.
46 Id.
'7 Id. at 995-97.
" Id. at 995; see, e.g., Lease & Interchange of Vehicles, 49 C.F.R. § 1057 (1980); Hours
of Service of Drivers, 49 C.F.R. § 395 (1980); Identification of Vehicles, 49 C.F.R. § 1058
(1980); and Qualifications of Drivers, 49 C.F.R. § 391 (1980). See also note 52 infra (discussion
of indicia of control arising out of federal regulations).
" 649 F.2d at 995.
' Id. (citing Local 814, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters (Santini Bros. Inc.), 208
N.L.R.B. 184, 197 n.18 (1974), remanded for clarification, 512 F.2d 564 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
clarified, 223 N.L.R.B. 752, upheld, 546 F.2d 989 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818
(1977)).
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court examined the terms of the lease agreement and the practice of the
parties in dealing with each other. 1 The court noted that federal regula-
tions determined some of the terms of the lease agreement and influenced
the course of dealing, although the Fourth Circuit did not identify ex-
amples of either."2 In addition, the Fourth Circuit considered other fac-
tors important to a determination of whether Cunningham was an em-
ployee or independent contractor. The court noted that Cunningham did
not complete his employment application form and that Tri-State person-
nel files identified Cunningham as a driver for owner-broker rather than
simply a driver. 3 Tri-State paid Cunningham and Coss on a percentage
basis for each job, withholding no tax, social security, or other payroll
deductions. 4 Tri-State needed Coss's permission before a driver other
than Cunningham could operate the leased rig." The Fourth Circuit fur-
ther considered the parties' perceptions of the employment relationship,5
Cunningham's right to refuse a job,57 and Tri-State's ability to terminate
, 649 F.2d at 996-97.
, Id. at 995. The Fourth Circuit in Tri-State stated that. many lease provisions
obligating Tri-State's performance arose from federal and state regulations. d.
Federal regulations require the lessee to provide liability insurance for public injury
and damages to shipped goods. 49 C.F.R. § 1043.1 (1980). Regulations require the lessee to
display his insignia, name, and number prominently on leased vehicles. Id. § 1058. The
lessee must give each driver a written examination or obtain-a certificate stating the driver
has passed a written examination. Id. § 391.11(b)(11). The lessee must ensure that its drivers
are conversant with regulations establishing the maximum driving and on-duty time, travel
time, and those requiring that drivers maintain and file daily logs of their trips. I § 395.1-.3
& .7-.9. The motor carrier may not permit a person to drive a motor vehicle unless the per-
son meets the specifications set forth in the regulations. Id. § 391.11.
The Fourth Circuit also noted that lessor Coss assumed responsibility for furnishing
the necessary licenses, for paying fines and penalties arising out of illegal operation of the
rig, for maintenance costs, and for insurance of the equipment itself. 649 F.2d at 996.
1 649 F.2d at 996. The Fourth Circuit in Tri-State stressed that the application form
conformed to federal regulations requiring the lessee to obtain certain information from
each driver. Id. at n.4; see 49 C.F.R. §§ 391.21, .61 & .63 (1980) (requirements of application
for employment and limited exceptions to requirements).
1 649 F.2d at 996. Tri-State did make deductions for drivers having the status of
employees. Id. Coss was responsible for Cunningham's fringe benefits. Brief for Petitioner,
supra note 26, at 9.
649 F.2d at 996.
Id. The parties involved in the dispute in Tri-State did not agree on the nature of
the employment relationship. Id. Tri-State's general manager considered Cunningham one
of Coss's employees. Id. Tri-State's president thought Cunningham and Coss were partners,
though Coss's wife testified that no partnership existed. Id. Cunningham considered himself
a Tri-State employee. Id.
1, Id. The TriState majority implied that Tri-State's president deferred to Coss on
whether Cunningham had to make the trip. Id. The majority further stressed that Cunn-
ingham's concern with profit and loss on the trip indicated an entrepreneurial interest on
his part. Id. The Tri-State dissent elaborated that Coss, also concerned over the risk of loss
on the trip, nevertheless considered any attempt to refuse Tri-State's request on that point
futile, indicating that Cunningham and Coss lacked authority to make entrepreneurial deci-
sions affecting profit and loss. Id at 1001 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
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the employment relationship. 8 The court found the record did not sup-
port the ALJ's findings, affirmed by the NLRB, that Cunningham was a
Tri-State employee. 9 The majority of the factors on which the ALJ
relied to establish control were "expressions or consequences" of federal
regulations, and, therefore, irrelevant to the determination of employ-
ment status."
The Tri-State dissent criticized the majority opinion on two grounds.
The dissent asserted that the majority conducted a de novo review of
Cunningham's status under the Act instead of applying the standard of
review the majority had established.6 The dissent criticized the majority
for not enforcing the Board's choice between fairly conflicting views, as
the applicable standard of review required.2 The dissent characterized
the Board's decision as reasonable in light of the evidence that the whole
record presented.3
Secondly, the Tri-State dissent argued that since the effects of
federal regulations are significant, the court should consider the regula-
tions as factors in evaluating an individual's employment status under
the right to control test. 4 Under the dissent's analysis, the right to con-
trol rather than the reason for control, is important regardless of the
form the control takes. The dissent characterized the "involuntary" in-
cidents of control that the regulations mandated as representing only
I Id. at 997. Tri-State terminated the lease agreement, effectively firing Cunningham.
Id. Coss actually fired Cunningham, telling him that Tri-State "had fired his truck." Id.
9 Id.
I Id. The Fourth Circuit in Ti-State provided no explanation for the holding except to
note that the ALJ erroneously had relied on indicia of employer control derived from
federal regulations. Id. The Board decision, affirming the ALJ's judgment that Cunningham
was a Tri-State employee, listed several factors in the employment relationship as critical.
245 N.L.R.B. at 1032. Of the critical factors the Board cited to support the conclusion that
Cunningham was an employee, federal regulations affected only Tri-State's prohibition on
backhauling, the drivers' mandatory daily logs, and some of the rules Tri-State imposed on
all drivers. See 649 F.2d at 1000; 245 N.L.R.B. at 1032. The factors the Board cited included
Tri-State's control over assignments because Cunningham could not refuse a job and Tri-
State's subsequent control over Cunningham's income, especially since he could not aug-
ment his income with other hauling jobs. 245 N.L.R.B. at 1032. Other factors were
Tri-State's discharge threats and use of lease cancellation as a disciplinary measure, and
Tri-State's control over Cunningham's employment conditions and work hours. Id.
" 649 F.2d at 998 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); see text accompanying notes 42-46
supra.
62 649 F.2d at 1004 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting), see notes 42-44 supra (applicable stan-
dard).
649 F.2d at 998 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
"Id.
I Id. at 998-99 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The Tri-State dissent disagreed with the
majority's decision to ignore federal regulatory controls and examine only controls Tri-
State imposed on its own initiative. Id. at 998. Nevertheless, the dissent evaluated Tri-
State's additional controls in isolation and found them sufficiently indicative of control to
establish an employer-employee relationship. Id. at 1000; see notes 68-70 infra.
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the threshold level of Tri-State's control over Cunningham."8 The dissent
found that Tri-State imposed sufficient additional controls to make Cun-
ningham an employee. 7 For example, Tri-State closely supervised Cun-
ningham's work, imposing a number of rules on all drivers, only some of
which derived from federal regulations.8 In addition, Tri-State's presi-
dent considered herself Cunningham's boss and treated him as an em-
ployee,"9 and Tri-State controlled Cunningham's income by prohibiting
moonlighting and backhauling.10 The dissent applied a standard different
from the majority's for assessing the effect of federal regulations on the
right to control test 1 and characterized the relationship between Cun-
ningham and Tri-State as an employer-employee relationship. 2
649 F.2d at 1000 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
67 Id.
Id. Tri-State's president told Cunningham that she would not tolerate unauthorized
female passengers, drinking, loafing, or moonlighting and that Tri-State would not pay Coss
until Cunningham turned in his trip log..Id. Federal regulations do not prohibit loafing or
moonlighting, but § 392.60 of the ICC regulations prohibits unauthorized passengers. 49
C.F.R. § 392.60 (1980). Section 392.5 prohibits drinking and driving, and § 391.15(c)(2) dis-
qualifies a driver for that offense. Id. §§ 392.60, 391.15(c)(2)(i). A driver's failure to complete
trip logs accurately and keep them current, or the carrier's failure to file logs promptly and
retain them as required subjects both driver and carrier to prosecution. Id. § 395.8(a). The
dissent noted that the regulations do not require drivers to turn the logs in on time as a
'precondition of payment. 649 F.2d at 1000 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
89 649 F.2d at 1000-01 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). Tri-State's president told Cunn-
inghan she was his boss, and Coss also referred to her as Cunningham's boss on at least one
occasion. Id. at 1001. The president had authority to hire and fire Cunningham and threaten-
ed to fire Cunningham when she suspected him of allowing an unauthorized female
passenger to accompany him in violation of Tri-State rules and federal regulations. Id.; see
note 68 supra. In addition, Tri-State's dispatch and scheduling procedures ensured that Tri-
State retained control through setting time schedules, checking trip logs, assigning jobs,
and setting routes. 649 F.2d at 1001 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The Tr-State dissent
disputed the majority's contention that occasional use of Coss as a relay indicated Coss
supervised Cunningham. Id. at 1001.
,0 649 F.2d at 1003 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). ICC regulations provide that the lessee
maintain exclusive possession, control, and use of the equipment. 49 C.F.R. § 1057.12(d)(1)
(1980). Parties to the lease may agree to limit those provisions to times when the lessee is
using the equipment. Id. § 1057.12(d)(4). Tri-State controlied Cunningham's income because
Tri-State denied him any opportunity to exercise entrepreneurial judgment by rejecting Tri-
State assignments or engaging in moonlighting and backhauling. 649 F.2d at 1002-03 (Mur-
naghan, J., dissenting).
," 649 F.2d at 999 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The Ti-State dissent considered federal
regulations as significant factors in resolving the dispute over Tri-State's right to control
Cunningham's activities in the performance of his duties. Id.; see text accompanying notes
64-65 & 48-50 supra (majority standard).
" 649 F.2d at 998 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The Ti-State dissent contended that
substantial evidence supported the Board's interpretation of the employment relationship,
obligating the court to uphold the Board's decision that Cunningham was a Tri-State
employee. Id. at 1004; see text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
The Tr-State dissent further considered the possibility that Tri-State and Coss might
be joint employers of Cunningham. Id. at 1003-04 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
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The Fourth Circuit's reliance on the common-law right to control
test to distinguish independent contractors from employees is consistent
with prior Fourth Circuit decisions. In NLRB v. A. S. Abell Co.,73 the
Fourth Circuit examined whether newspaper carriers were employees
or independent contractors under the Act.74 Like the Tri-State court, the
Abell court considered the nature and amount of control the employer
retained by examining the totality of circumstances in the employment
relationship.75 The Abell court cited a variety of factors contributing to
the decision that the carriers were independent contractors.78 The Abell
court emphasized the factors demonstrating that the carriers exercised
judgment to determine the working environment and to control income."
The Fourth Circuit also applied the right to control test in Taylor v.
Local No. 7 International Union of Journeyman Horseshoers," to deter-
mine whether farriers engaged in a group boycott and price fixing action
were employees and, therefore, exempt from antitrust legislation." The
Taylor court stressed the importance under the right to control test of
determining whether the contractor exercised judgment in completing
the assigned tasks."
Several other circuits have applied the right to control test to deter-
mine whether an individual is an independent contractor or an employee.'
327 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1964).
7' Id. at 4-10.
7 Id. at 4-5.
Id at 6-9. The Abell court noted that the newspapers provided neither benefits nor
workmen's compensation and withheld no taxes. Id. at 8-9. In addition, the Abell court found
that the contracts between the parties specified that no employment relationship existed
and that the paper's supervision of delivery procedures was minimal. Id. at 6-7. The
publishers did exert some control over the carriers' performance of delivery duties by pro-
hibiting the carriers from delivering advertisements with the papers, setting the
geographical boundaries of each carrier's territory, and setting the cost of the papers to the
carriers and the price to the customers. Id. at 3, 9.
" Id. at 7-8. The carriers made entrepreneurial judgments about the use of assistants,
the number of papers to order, how to prevent damage to papers after receipt, the method
of customer payment, and how many and what hours to work.'Id. The carriers bore the con-
sequences in profit and loss of these business judgments. Id. at 7.
' 353 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 969 (1966).
' Id. at 596. The Taylor court cited the Restatement of Agency in applying the right
to control test to determine if farriers were employees under the antitrust laws. 353 F.2d at
599. The court declared that the farriers were independent contractors because they per-
formed a skilled task with their own tools, controlled their own income by setting their own
hours and fees, brought their materials, established their own credit policies, received pay-
ment by the job, worked for a number of employers, and perceived themselves as indepen-
dent contractors as did their employers. Id. at 599-600.
Id. at 596.
1 See, e.g., NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 606 F.2d 379, 382 (3d Cir. 1979) (ability to con-
trol details of performance determines individual's status); Local 777, Democratic Union
Organizing Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (real issue is putative
employer's right to control manner and means of job performance); NLRB v. Warner, 587
F.2d 896, 899 (8th Cir. 1978) (right to control test focuses on nature and amount of control
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The First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, however, have adopted a narrow
definition of the right to control test and have applied the test in con-
junction with other factors.2 A narrow interpretation of the right to con-
trol test limits the scope of the test to an examination of the putative
employer's right to supervise the details of the worker's job perform-
ance.' Additional factors considered include whether the putative
employer provides benefits,84 how the company and the worker perceive
the worker's status," the types of services rendered,8 the entrepreneur-
ial nature of the disputed worker's tasks8" and who bears the risk of loss
and opportunity for gain.8 Other circuits, in applying the right to control
test, have interpreted the test to encompass all factors relevant to a
determination of employment status.88 The apparent difference among
the circuits results from the elements that the courts label as part of the
common-law test and not from a variance in the elements that the courts
putative employer reserves); Lorenz Schneider, Inc. v. NLRB, 517 F.2d 445, 449, 451 (2d Cir.
1975) (right to control test, though difficult to apply, distinguishes employees and indepen-
dent contractors); NLRB v. Cement Transp., Inc., 490 F.2d 1024, 1027 (6th Cir. 1974) (right
to control, and not actual exercise of control, determines individual's status). Accord, Con-
tinental Bus Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 267, 271 (10th Cir. 1963) (applied right to control
test to evaluate status of maintenance workers).
'5 See, e.g., Merchants Home Delivery Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 966, 972-73 (9th
Cir. 1978) (application of right to control test must be tempered by other relevant considera-
tions); NLRB v. Deaton, Inc., 502 F.2d 1221, 1223 (5th Cir. 1974) (right to control test not sole
analytical tool used to determine individual's status); Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 506
F.2d 596, 598 (1st Cir. 1974) (although right to control test generally determinative of
employee status, other factors also relevant).
See note 82 supra.
" Merchant's Home Delivery Serv. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 1978),
See NLRB v. Deaton, Inc., 502 F.2d 1221, 1224 (5th Cir. 1974).
wId.
" See Seven-Up Bottling Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 506 F.2d 596, 599-600 (1st Cir. 1974).
'5 See, e.g., NLRB v. Maine Caterers, Inc., 654 F.2d 131, 133 (1st Cir. 1981); NLRB v.
Amber Delivery Serv., Inc., 651 F.2d 57, 61 (1st Cir. 1981); Merchant's Home Delivery Serv.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 1978).
" See generally NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 606 F.2d 379, 382 (3d Cir. 1979) (common-
law right to control test encompasses examination of kind of services, possibility of en-
trepreneurial activity resulting in profit or loss, mode of compensation, contractual provi-
sions and practice of parties, and disciplinary methods adopted); NLRB v. Warner, 587 F.2d
896, 899-900 (8th Cir. 1978) (factors considered in determining employment status include
right to hire and fire; method and determination of amount of payment; possibility of profit
or loss because of independent enterprise; permancency of relationship; and party fur-
nishing tools, controlling premises, and designating where work occurs).
The NLRB also considers the right to control test to encompass more than the distinc-
tion between controlling the manner and means of performance and accepting or rejecting
the end product. Standard Oil Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 967, 968 (1977) see not6 5 supra (employer's
right to control manner and means of performance indicates employee status). The NLRB
considers such factors as whether the functions performed are an integral part of the com-
pany's business, the permanence and exclusivity of the employment relationship, and the
skill level of the putative employee. 230 N.L.R.B. at 968. The Board also examines the
degree of an individual's proprietary interest in his business and whether he makes entre-
preneurial decisions affecting profit and loss that determine his income. Id.
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consider relevant to a determination of employment status. The Fourth
Circuit has adopted the dominant approach in applying the right to con-
trol test to distinguish employees from independent contractors and in
considering the scope of the test broad enough to encompass all aspects
of the employment relationship.90
In applying the right to control test to determine independent con-
tractor or employee status, judicial and Board decisions have turned on
the totality of circumstances characterizing the relationship.9 Courts
weigh all the elements of the employment relationship, balarlcing those
indicating employee status against those indicating independent contrac-
tor status, and characterize the relationship as one or the other depend-
ing on the overall weight of the evidence.9 Courts have examined the
nature of the employment relationship in great detail and have grouped
the factors under review into factors tending to indicate independent
contractor status and factors more representative of employee status.9'
Courts have concluded that an individual who makes entrepreneurial
decisions affecting his income by accepting or rejecting assignments,
choosing whether to engage in backhauling or moonlighting, assuming
operation and maintenance costs on his own equipment, accepting pay-
ment by the job, receiving no employee benefits, and hiring or firing
assistants on his own initiative is more like an independent contractor
than an employee.94 Various courts have considered such factors as lease
statements indicating the intention to avoid an employment
relationship,9' lack of supervision over the details of the performance, 9
and differences in the employer's treatment of conceded employees and
employees whose status is in dispute97 as relevant in deciding that an in-
NLRB v. A. S. Abell Co., 327 F.2d 1, 7-9 (4th Cir. 1964) (court considered contractual
provisions, entrepreneurial decisions, risk of profit or loss, method of payment, and parties'
perception of employment relationship).
91 See, e.g., NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968); NLRB v. Maine
Caterers, Inc., 654 F.2d 131, 132 (1st Cir. 1981); NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 606 F.2d 379,
382 (3d Cir. 1979); Robbins Motor Transp., Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 761, 764 (1975); Portage
Transfer Co., 204 N.L.R.B. 787, 788 (1973).
" See, e.g., NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of AM., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968); NLRB v. Maine
Caterers, Inc., 654 F.2d 131, 132-34 (1st Cir. 1981); NLRB v. A. S. Abell Co., 327 F.2d 1, 10
(4th Cir. 1967).
" See text accompanying notes 94-97 infra (factors indicating independent contractor
status).
See, e.g., NLRB v. Amber Delivery Serv., Inc., 651 F.2d 57, 61 (1st Cir. 1981); NLRB
v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 606 F.2d 379, 382-84 (3d Cir. 1979); Merchants Home Delivery Serv.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 966, 974-75 (9th Cir. 1978); Lorenz Schneider Co. v. NLRB, 517 F.2d
445, 447-48 (2d Cir. 1975); Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42 v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 1322,1326-27
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Carnation Co. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 1130, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 1970).
" See Local 777, Democratic Union Organizing Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 868
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Steel City Transp., Inc. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 735, 738 (3d Cir. 1968).
" See Lorenz Schneider Co. v. NLRB, 517 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1975); SIDA, Inc. v.
NLRB, 512 F.2d 354, 357-59 (9th Cir. 1975).
' See NLRB v. Warner, 587 F.2d 896, 900-01 (8th Cir. 1978); National Van Lines v.
NLRB, 273 F.2d 402, 405 (7th Cir. 1960).
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dividual is an independent contractor rather than an employee. In con-
trast, certain other factors characterize an employer-employee relation-
ship. An individual who may not refuse an assignment without penalty
or engage in backhauling or moonlighting at his own discretion more
resembles an employee than an independent contractor." Similarly, a
worker whose putative employer sets his hours and pays him a wage or
salary including benefits and, payroll deductions is more like an
employee than an independent contractor.9 The use of lease termination
as a disciplinary measure and close supervision of the details of job per-
formance also suggest employee status.'0
Cunningham's status as employee or independent contractor was
controversial. Certain facets of the relationship between Cunningham
and Tri-State support the majority's contention that Cunningham was
not a Tri-State employee. Tri-State paid Cunningham by the job, provided
no benefits, and made no withholding deductions from his pay.' Cun-
ningham and Coss were responsible for operating and maintenance
costs.0 2 The lease indicated that as driver of a leased vehicle, Cunning-.
ham did not obtain employee status, and the parties' perceptions of the
relationship conflicted."0 ' Tri-State personnel records characterized Cun-
ningham's status as driver for broker, while classifying other employees
as drivers.' Cunningham's reluctance to accept an unprofitable job
demonstrated Cunningham's knowledge of and concern with the costs
associated with doing business, a significant indicator of entrepreneur-
ship.10' The Fourth Circuit considered each of these factors important,
especially the personnel records classifying Cunningham as driver for
broker rather than driver and the controversy arising out of Cunning-
ham's refusal to make a trip certain to represent a loss.'
Other aspects of the relationship between Cunningham and Tri-
State support the Board's decision that Cunningham was a Tri-State
employee. The record did not clarify whether Cunningham had the right
to refuse a job, but Tri-State's president successfully prevailed upon
" See NLRB v. Amber Delivery Serv., Inc., 651 F.2d 51, 52 (1st Cir. 1981); Aetna
Freight Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 520 F.2d 928, 930-31 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910
(1976).
" See NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 257 (1968) (employer provides
bonuses and other fringe benefits indicating employee status); News-Journal Co. v. NLRB,
447 F.2d 65, 66-67 (3d Cir. 1971) (no withholding tax indicates independent contractor
status); NLRB v. Keystone Floors, Inc., 306 F.2d 560, 562 (3d Cir. 1962) (requirement that
salesman work eight-hour days and full work week indicates employee status).
110 See Aetna Freight Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 520 F.2d 928, 930 (6th Cir. 1975); Joint Coun-
cil of Teamsters No. 42 v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 1322, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
101 See text accompanying note 54 supra.
00 See note 52 supra.
0 See note 56 & text accompanying note 24 supra.
00 See note 53 supra.
" See note 57 supra.
649 F.2d at 996-97.
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Cunningham to accept a job that would lose money, indicating that Tri-
State dealt with him as an employee."' Although both Tr-State and Coss
participated in dispatch procedures, Tri-State scheduled jobs, selected
routes, and otherwised controlled the details of Cunningham's duties."8
Tri-State effectively limited Cunningham's income by prohibiting
backhauling and moonlighting."9 Furthermore, Tri-State used lease
cancellation to discipline Cunningham and terminate his employment."0
Thus, several factors support the Board's and the Tri-State dissent's
conclusion that Cunningham was a Tri-State employee.
Since the determination of an individual's employment status re-
quires an assessment of all factors affecting the employment relation-
ship,"' the NLRB and several circuit courts of appeals have considered
the effect of federal regulations on the application of the right to control
test."' The NLRB and courts have agreed that federal regulations com-
plicate assessment of the putative employer's right to control in a par-
ticular situation.13 The NLRB has developed a standard for evaluating
the effect of federal regulations on the putative employer's right to con-
trol the manner and means of the worker's performance."' The Board's
application of the right to control test is identical to that of the Tri-State
dissent, which stated that the source of controls is irrelevant to an as-
sessment of the degree of control an employer exerts over the driver.1
5
The NLRB has asserted that while the scope of federal regulation in the
trucking indusiry may not be sufficient to establish employer control,
the regulations are comprehensive enough to preclude the need for a
carrier's own personnel policies or operational standards."0 The Third,
Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have adopted the Board's standard, find-
ing federally mandated controls as relevant as other factors to assessing
" Id. at 1001 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). See also Steel City Transp. Inc. v. NLRB,
389 F.2d 735, 738 (3d Cir. 1968).
1os 649 F.2d at 1001-02. See note 68 supra.
109 See text accompanying note 68 supra.
649 F.2d at 1002.
" See text accompanying notes 81-90 supra.
1 See text accompanying notes 113-15 infra.
113 See, e.g., NLRB v. Deaton, Inc., 502 F.2d 1221, 1224 (5th Cir. 1974); Kreitz Motor Ex-
press, Inc., 210 N.L.R.B. 27, 29 (1974).
114 Mitchell Bros. Truck Lines, 249 N.L.R.B. 476, 480-81 (1980) (citing Robbins Motor
Transp. Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 761, 764 (1975) and John Himmer Transfer, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 284,
285 (1975) for proposition that proper standard is consideration of degree of control putative
employer exerts regardless of whether federal regulations or other business reasons man-
date employer action). The NLRB expressly disavowed prior decisions indicating that
courts could ignore controls exercised pursuant to federal regulations in applying the right
to control test. 249 N.L.R.B. at 480.
" Mitchell Bros. Truck Lines, 249 N.L.R.B. 476, 480-81 (1980); see text accompanying
notes 63-64 supra.
"I Mitchell Bros. Truck Lines, 249 N.L.R.B. 476, 480 (1980).
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the employment relationship. "7 Clearly, the Fourth Circuit is in the
minority in adopting the position that mandatory regulations are irrele-
vant to an evaluation of the employer's right to control."'
The Tri-State court's failure to express a rationale for adopting the
minority view detracts from the validity of that position."' Requiring
common carriers to exert sufficient control over drivers of leased
vehicles to qualify as employers is not the purpose of the federal regula-
tions. 120 Nevertheless, the regulations do pervade the employment rela-
tionship. Ignoring the elements of control emanating from comprehen-
sive federal regulations unnecessarily complicates application of the
right to control test.2 ' The pervasiveness of federal regulations has con-
fused reviewing courts attempting to identify the sources of particular
indicia of control." In addition, since the common-law test encompasses
all aspects of the employment relationship, no reason exists to exclude
those aspects arising out of federal regulations."3 Therefore, the more
reasonable and more easily applied standard for measuring the right to
control is the standard the NLRB and other circuits have adopted. The
Fourth Circuit adopted the wrong standard for assessing the degree to
which courts should consider controls emanating from federal regula-
tions when applying the right to control test. 24 The unanimity of the
" NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 606 F.2d 379, 385 (3d Cir. 1979); Merchants Home
Delivery Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 1978); Aetna Freight Lines, Inc. v.
NLRB, 520 F.2d 928, 930 (6th Cir. 1975); SIDA, Inc. v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 354, 359 (9th Cir.
1975); NLRB v. Cement Transp., Inc., 490 F.2d 1024, 1027 (6th Cir. 1974); Ace Doran Hauling
& Rigging Co. v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 190, 194 (6th Cir. 1972); Steel City Transp., Inc. v. NLRB,
389 F.2d 735, 737-38 (3d Cir. 1968); cf. NLRB v. Deaton, Inc., 502 F.2d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir.
1974) (court reserved question whether ICC regulations alone are sufficient control to
establish employment relationship).
"1 649 F.2d at 995. The Fourth Circuit relied on a Board decision holding that owner-
operators are independent contractors unless a carrrier imposes a layer of regulation
beyond that which government regulation mandates. Id., citing Local 814, Int'l Brotherhood
of Teamsters (Santini Bros., Inc.), 208 N.L.R.B. 184, 197 n.18 (1974). The NLRB no longer
adheres to this view. See Mitchell Bros. Truck Lines, 249 N.L.R.B. 476, 480 (1980) (federal
regulations are relevant in assessing control carrier imposed on owner-operators, and may
be sufficient to establish employee status). But see Local 777, Democratic Union Organizing
Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Board should not consider municipal
regulations beyond company's control as meaningful indicia of control).
"' 649 F.2d at 995, 997.
,, See note 14 supra.
' See 649 F.2d at 998-99 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
' Compare 649 F.2d at 1006 n.6 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (assertion that federal
regulation does not require dismissal of drivers for infraction of regulation prohibiting
drinking and driving) with 49 C.F.R. § 391.15(c)(2)(i) (1980) (motor carrier must dismiss
driver disqualified for driving under influence of alcohol).
" Cf. White v. Excalibur Ins. Co., 599 F.2d 50, 52-53 (5th Cir. 1979) (application of right
to control test to determine individual's employment status in tort action resulted in con-
sideration of motor carriers as statutory employers whose control over drivers of leased
vehicles derived from federal regulations).
14 See text accompanying notes 113-19 supra.
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Board and other circuits that have addressed the question", suggests
that courts facing the issue for the first time should ignore the Fourth
Circuit's interpretation and consider federally mandated controls rele-
vant but not decisive in assessing the degree of control an employer ex-
ercises over a putative employee.
Even under the right to control test that the Tri-State court pro-
mulgated,'26 the majority erred in reversing the Board's decision that
Cunningham was a Tri-State employee. An appellate court may not sub-
stitute its own judgment regarding an employment relationship for that
of the Board if the Board's interpretation was reasonable." Reviewing
courts have deferred to a Board decision characterized as reasonable,
even when disagreeing with the Board's interpretation of the employ-
ment relationship. 28 When overruling a Board decision determining
employment status, courts have identified explicitly the Board's error."
The Tri-State record considered as a whole reveals that the Board's deci-
sion represented a reasonable choice between conflicting views of the
facts.30 The Fourth Circuit's characterization of the Board's decision as
1" See text accompanying notes 114-16 supra.
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Maine Caterers, Inc., 654 F.2d 131, 133 (1st Cir. 1981) (reviewing
court should uphold Board order even if different choice justifiable); NLRB v. Amber
Delivery Serv., Inc., 651 F.2d 57, 62-63 (1st Cir. 1981) (duty to enforce Board order that was
reasonable, despite evidence supporting opposite result); NLRB v. Deaton, Inc., 502 F.2d
1221, 1224-28 (5th Cir. 1974) (enforcing Board order because sufficient evidence supported
determination of employee status). But see Ace Doran Hauling & Rigging Co. v. NLRB, 462
F.2d 190, 193-94 (6th Cir. 1972) (enforcement of Board order granted to single owner drivers
and denied to drivers of vehicles carrier leased from multiple owners would represent un-
justified expansion of term "employee"); Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42 v. NLRB, 450
F.2d 1322, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (Board decision representing choice between
two fairly conflicting views must stand).
12 See text 'accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
x" NLRB v. United Ins. Co of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 260 (1968) (refusal to enforce Board's
decision merely because reviewing court would have decided differently if court heard issue
de novo constitutes error); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1950)
(reviewing court may not displace Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views). See
also Hosiery Corp. of Am. v. NLRB, 422 F.2d 784, 786 (4th Cir. 1970) (applying substantial
evidence standard, court overruled Board's decision that employee's solicitation during
work hours constituted protected activity). See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
" See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 492 (1950) (reviewing court
must examine entire record and determine if record supports Board's decision); NLRB v. A.
Duie Pyle, Inc., 606 F.2d 379, 387 (3d Cir. 1979) (overruling Board due to failure to consider
relevant agency principles); Merchants Home Delivery Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 966,
973-76 (9th Cir. 1978) (court in overruling Board clearly identified relevant facts supporting
court conclusion and noted Board's misapplication of law); Carnation Co. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d
1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 1970) (court overruled Board because Board failed to apply agency prin-
ciples in determining employment status and neither overruled, distinguished, nor followed
similar cases); NLRB v. A. S. Abbll Co., 327 F.2d 1, 5-6 (4th Cir, 1964) (although court may
not substitute its judgment for Board's judgment, Court must overrule Board when evidence
insufficient to support Board decision).
" See text accompanying notes 101-10 supra.
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unsupported by the record neither pinpoints the Board's error nor
clarifies the court's rationale. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, exceeded
its discretion in overruling the Board. The Fourth Circuit's error,
however, probably will not affect future cases because the court did
recognize the applicable standard of review. 3'
Once the Fourth Circuit reversed the Board, the court should have
remanded the case for clarification of Cunningham's relationship with
the lessor Coss. The majority noted that Cunningham and Coss might be
profit sharers or partners, supporting the majority's contention that
Cunningham was an independent contractor. 3 2 The Tri-State dissent
pointed out that Coss and Tri-State might be joint employers of Cunn-
ingham, supporting the dissent's conclusion that Cunningham was an
employee." Other courts considering the status of a non-owner driver of
a leased vehicle have found the individiaul to be an employee either of
the carrier or of the vehicle's lessor."u Thus, the court should have ques-
tioned whether Cunningham was an employee of Coss. Non-owner drivers
are generally within the coverage of the Act,3 5 which protects drivers
participating in concerted activities from employer retaliation. Congress
intended the independent contractor exception to the Act to prevent the
Board and appellate courts from engaging in unwarranted expansion of
employee status.36 The Fourth Circuit, however, denied the Act's pro-
tection to an individual by categorizing him as an independent contrac-
tor based on a misapplication of the right to control test and an error in
assessing the scope of its review of Board decisions.
CATHERINE O'CONNOR
"' See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
13 649 F.2d at 997. The majority noted that Cunningham might be an employee of Coss.
Id. Such a conclusion required further consideration of Cunningham's Atatus once the Ti-
State court concluded that he was not a Tri-State employee.
" Id. at 1003-04.
,u See, eg., Aetna Freight Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 520 F.2d 928, 930 (6th Cir. 1975) (non-
owner drivers are employees of carrier); NLRB v. Deaton, Inc., 502 F.2d 1221, 1222 (5th Cir.
1974) (non-owner drivers of leased vehicles conceded to be employees); Ace Doran Hauling
& Rigging Co. v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 190, 194 (6th Cir. 1972) (non-owner drivers are employees
of lessor because lessor operates from distinct location, provides variety of services for
multiple companies, interchanges drivers with other employees, and has sole control over
hiring, firing, working conditions, wages, and fringe benefits); Steel City Transp. Inc. v.
NLRB, 389 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir. 1968) (non-owner drivers and owner-operators are
employees of carrier).
' See note 134 supra.
,1, See note 7 supra.
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D. Section 8(a)(3) Dual Motive Cases
Under section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act' ("NLRA"
or "the Act") an employer commits an unfair labor practice when he
discharges an employee in order to encourage or discourage membership
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Congress passed the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA" or "the Act") or Wagner Act, in 1935. National Labor Relations Act,
Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979)).
Congress enacted the NLRA to secure employees' right to organize and to encourage collec-
tive bargaining. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). See also NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343
U.S. 395, 401-03 (1952); NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 265-66
(1938). In 1947, Congress passed the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), or Taft-
Hartley Act, believing the NLRA to be too favorable to unions. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97
(1976 & Supp. mI 1979). See also Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 656, 661 (7th
Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 388 U.S. 175 (1967); F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, LABOR
RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 12 (1977) [hereinafter cited as BARTOSIC]; S. REP. No.
105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 20, reprinted in H LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1018 (1948). Title I of the LMRA, §§ 101-04, amended
the NLRA to protect nonunion employees from union coercion. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(b)
(1976 & Supp. III 1979). Title I of the JMRA includes 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976 & Supp. I
1979) and is still known as the National Labor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 167 (1976).
The NLRA applies to all employees except supervisors, agricultural laborers,
domestic servants employed at a person's home, anyone employed by his parents or spouse,
independent contractors or anyone employed under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§
151-88 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (Supp. I1 1979). Section 7 is the core of the
NLRA and guarantees to employees the right to join a labor organization, to bargain collec-
tively, and to engage in other "concerted activities," or to refrain from any of these activi-
ties. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976 & Supp. II 1978). See BARTOSIC, supra, at 12. Section 8 of the
NLRA sets forth and defines various unfair labor practices. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976). Sec-
tion 8(a) defines employer unfair labor practices and § 8(b) defines union unfair labor prac-
tices. See id. at § 158(a), (b).
Section 3 of the NLRA authorizes creation of the National Labor Relations Board
("the Board" or "NLRB"), which consists of five members appointed for five-year terms by
the President with Senate approval. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1976). The NLRB is an administra-
tive agency with exclusive original jurisdiction to enforce the NLRA and LMRA. See Amal-
gamated Clothing Workers of Am. v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 516-17 (1955). Section 3 of
the Act also creates the office of General Counsel. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976). The General
Counsel, like the Board itself, acts on behalf of the public and not a particular victim of alleg-
ed unfair practices. Local 282 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 795, 799-800 (2d
Cir. 1964). Section 6 of the Act empowers the Board to establish rules under the Act. 29
U.S.C. § 156 (1976). Under § 9, the Board may hold hearings and conduct elections regarding
representation questions. Id. at § 159. Section 10 authorizes the Board to prevent and
remedy unfair labor practices. Id. at § 160.
An unfair labor practice case begins when a private party files a charge with the
NLRB within six months of the occurrence of the alleged misconduct. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)
(1976); see Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 34 n.30 (1954). See generally BAR-
TOSIC, supra, at 15-17. The General Counsel has the power to investigate charges, and issue
and prosecute complaints before the Board. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976). If the General Counsel
issues a complaint, and the parties cannot reach a settlement, the parties hold a hearing be-
fore an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). See id. at § 160(b); 29 C.F.R. § 101.10 (1981). The
ALJ acts as a trier of fact, makes conclusions of law and issues a recommended order. 29
C.F.R. § 102.45(a) (1981). If the parties file exceptions to the ALJ's decision, the case goes
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in any labor organization.2 An employer, however, may dismiss an
employee involved in union activity on grounds not illegal under the
before the Board for review. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 102.46 (1981). The parties
submit supporting briefs, and the Board, usually sitting as a three-member panel, may allow
oral argument and submission of evidence before deciding the case on the entire record. 29
U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 102.48(b) (1981). The Board is not bound by the ALJ's find-
ings, and may make any contrary findings if supported by substantial evidence. NLRB v.
Duquesne Elec. & Mfg. Co., 518 F.2d 701, 704 (3d Cir. 1975); cf. NLRB v. New York-
Keansburg Long Branch Bus Co., 578 F.2d 472, 478 n.15 (3d Cir. 1978) (final determinations
of credibility rest with ALJ as long as he considers all relevant factors and sufficiently ex-
plains resolutions) (citing NLRB v. W.C. McQuaide, Inc., 552 F.2d 519, 526 n.14 (3d Cir.
1977). Upon finding an unfair labor practice, the Board may issue an order requiring the
practice to cease and requiring such affirmative action as reinstatement of employees with
or without back pay. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976); see BARTOSIC, supra, at 66-67.
Board orders are not self-enforcing. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976). If an employer
refuses to comply with an order, the Board must file a petition for enforcement with the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in the circuit where the unfair practice occurred or where
the employer resides or transacts business. Id. Any aggrieved party, moreover, can appeal
a Board decision to a Federal Circuit Court. See id. at § 160(f). Before a circuit court, the
findings of fact by the Board are conclusive if supported by "substantial" evidence. See
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951); 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
"Substantial" evidence means that the record must do more than create a suspicion that the
fact to be established exists. See Id The Supreme Court may review the decision of a cir-
cuit court by writ of certiorari. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
2 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). Under § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, an employer commits an
unfair labor practice by discriminating in regard to hiring, tenure, or any other condition of
employment to encourage or discourage employee membership in any labor organization.
Id; see American Shipbldg Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965). Section 8(a)(3) contains
two provisos. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). First, § 8(a)(3) allows an employer to conclude
an agreement with a representitive labor organization requiring all employees join the
labor organization within 30 days of the beginning of employment. See id.; NLRB v. Her-
shey Foods Corp., 513 F.2d 1083, 1084-87 (9th' Cir. 1975). Second, an employer may not
discharge an employee for lack of membership in the representative labor organization if
such organization discriminatorily denied or terminated the employee's membership. See 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40-42 (1954).
To prove a violation of § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, the General Counsel, see note 1 supra,
must show that the discharge was discriminatory and actually resulted in encouraging or
discouraging union membership. See NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 286 (1965). In addition,
the employer's motive or intent to discriminate is vital to proving a § 8(a)(3) violation. See
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278,
286-87 (1965); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 43 (1954). In § 8(a)(3) cases, the
Supreme Court differentiates between employer actions which are inherently destructive of
employee rights and actions which impact only slightly on employee interests. See, e.g.,
American Shipbldg Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311-12 (1965) (employer's action in closing
one shipyard and laying off workers at another when union contract negotiations stagnated
is not inherently destructive of union rights); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287-88 (1965)
(employer use of temporary nonunion personnel during lockout is not inherently destructive
of union rights); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227-28, 231 (1963) (employer
practice of giving superseniority only to workers who were not on strike is inherently
destructive of union rights); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 45 (1954) (employer
denial of job to worker allegedly not in good standing with union is inherently destructive of
employee rights because employer had no agreement with union requiring membership of
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Act.' When an employer discharges an employee under circumstances
suggesting both legal and illegal motives under the Act, courts face two
crucial issues. First, the court must determine the extent to which the il-
legal motive may have affected the employer's decision to fire the
employee and still not be a violation of section 8(a)(3) of the Act.4 Second,
the court must decide which party has the burden of proving the extent
to which the illegal motive influenced the employer's discharge decision.5
In NLRB v. Kiawah Island Co.,' the Fourth Circuit restated the language
used in previous Fourth Circuit opinions to decide dual motive cases
under section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
7
Defendant Kiawah Island Co. ("Kiawah") owns and operates a resort,
including a hotel and a restaurant.' Kiawah had continual problems in
maintaining proper standards of cleanliness in its food storage, prepara-
tion and service facilities.' After unsatisfactory results in numerous
state inspections, Kiawah demoted the foreman of the kitchen clean-up
crew, James Hymes.1° Shortly thereafter, Hymes and another member of
all employees). If the employer's action is inherently destructive of employee rights, the
Supreme Court will assume that the employer intended the natural consequences of his act
and will infer an intent to discriminate. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26,
33-34 (1967); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278,287 (1965); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S.
221, 228 (1963). If the employer's action has only a slight effect on employee interests, a
specific showing of discriminatory intent by the General Counsel is necessary to prove a
violation of § 8(a)(3). See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967); NLRB v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287-88 (1965); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227-28 (1963).
The remedies for § 8(a)(3) violations include Board orders requiring defendants to cease
engaging in unfair practices and orders requiring reinstatement of any affected employees
plus employees' back pay. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187-98 (1941); 29
U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976); note 1 supra.
' See, e.g., NLRB v. Bangor Plastics, Inc., 392 F.2d 772, 776-77 (6th Cir. 1967)
(employer lawfully discharged union member for directing vulgar remarks to foreman);
Lozano Enterprises v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 500, 502-03 (9th Cir. 1966) (misconduct of union ac-
tivist is proper ground for layoff); NLRB v. Soft Water Laundry, Inc., 346 F.2d 930, 932-35
(5th Cir. 1965) (union member's insubordination in presence of other employees is clear
justification for discharge).
See Allen v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 976, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Lowell Sun Publ.
Co., 320 F.2d 835, 842 (1st Cir. 1963). See also text accompanying notes 37-38 infra.
I See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34-35 (1967); NLRB v. Wright
Line, A Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d 899, 903-07 (1st Cir. 1981). See also text accompa-
nying notes 34-36 infra.
6 650 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1981).
' Id. at 490-91.
I & at 488.
Id. State inspectors examined the Kiawah Island Hotel kitchen immediately before
the hotel opened in 1976 and issued an unsatisfactory inspection rating. Id. Subsequent
state inspections produced several additional unsatisfactory ratings. Id. After the first in-
spection, Kiawah's general manager established a kitchen clean-up crew supervised by
employee Hymes. Id
1" I& The Kiawah hotel chef recommended that the management discharge kitchen
clean-up crew supervisor Hymes and employee Murray. Id at 489. The food and beverage
director, however, decided to give the employees another chance to improve, and merely
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the clean-up crew, Robert Murray, contacted union representatives
regarding the organization of a labor union at Kiawah.1' Two months
later, after another unsatisfactory inspection, the company suspended
Hymes and Murray for three days. 2 A week after the suspension, Kiawah
discharged Hymes and Murray for unsatisfactory performance after an
unacceptable internal inspection."3 The National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB" or "the Board") found that Kiawah discharged Hymes and Mur-
ray because of the employees' union activities in violation of section
8(a)(3) of the NLRA.'4 The Board then petitioned the Fourth Circuit for
an enforcement order.'
5
In kiawah, the Fourth Circuit recognized that Kiawah knew of the
union's attempt to organize when the company fired Hymes and Murray.'"
The court added, however, that Kiawah had valid reasons for releasing
the employees prior to, and independent of, their union activities. 7 The
Kiawah court began its analysis by stating the general rule that a
discharge violates the NLRA only if motivated by an unlawful discrimi-
natory intent.'8 The court further stated that, in the Fourth Circuit, the
demoted Hymes. Id. at 490. Meanwhile, Kiawah discharged the general manager and left
the clean-up crew under the control of the night auditor. Id. at 488. Kiawah subsequently
ordered the chef to assume total responsibility for kitchen cleanliness. Id at 489.
', Id. at 488. Hymes and Murray contacted and worked with the Hotel, Motel,
Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Union, Local 270, Hotel & Restaurant Employees &
Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO. Id. at 488 n.3. The company knew of the
employees' union contacts. Id. at 488.
12 Id. at 490.
Is Id. Kiawah discharged Hymes and Murray, demoted the manager of the dining
room, issued disciplinary warnings to three other non-supervisory employees, and
reprimanded the food and beverage director. Id. After additional unsatisfactory state
ratings, Kiawah discharged the chef, the food and beverage director, and the subsequently
hired chef and food beverage director. Id.
11 Id. at 487. The Hotel, Motel, Restaurant Employees and Bartender's Union filed the
original charges against Kiawah. See Recommended Order by P. Kirkwood, Administrative
Law Judge, January 16, 1980.
In addition to finding a § 8(a)(3) violation, the NLRB found that Kiawah violated §
8(a)(1) of the NLRA through statements and actions designed to deter the employees from
organizing a union. 650 F.2d at 487; see note 32 infra. The senior vice-president of the com-
pany told the employees that the company would fight the union as hard as the law would
permit and that the employees would be hurt by such a fight. 650 F.2d at 488. Company
supervisors denied several employees' raise requests admittedly because of the union fight
and told employees that the union would get the employees in trouble. Id. at 488-89. The
Board found that these actions threatened employees with retaliatory action for exercise of
§ 7 rights in violation of § 8(a)(1). Id.; see note 32 infra.
15 650 F.2d at 487; see note 1 supra.
,B 650 F.2d at 489. Proof of employer's knowledge of an employee's union activity is an
essential element in establishing that the discharge of that employee was discriminatory.
See Dubin-Haskell Lining Corp. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 568, 573 (4th Cir. 1967).
" 650 F.2d at 487; see text accompanying notes 9-13 supra.
"1 650 F.2d at 490; see Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 43 (1954); note 2
supra. An employer has discriminatory intent if he differentiates between union and, non-
union members for the purpose of discouraging union membership. See Montgomery Ward
& Co. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 555, 563-64 (7th Cir. 1939).
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rule in Neptune Water Meter Co. v. NLRB 9 controls situations in which
the evidence supports inferences of both discriminatory and non-
discriminatory reasons for the discharge of an employee." In Neptune,
the Fourth Circuit held that an employer violates section 8(a)(3) if a
discriminatory motive is a factor in the employer's decision to discharge
an employee.' The Neptune court also stated that the Board may find an
unfair labor practice only if the record enables the court to find that the
employer would not have discharged the employee except for the em-
ployee's union activity.' The Kiawah court' continued by stating that in
cases of legal and illegal discharge motives, the burden of persuasion
throughout the case falls on the General Counsel to show that a discrimi-
natory motive was a factor in the discharge. 4 The court stated that a cir-
cuit court must affirm an NLRB decision when substantial evidence sup-
ports the decision.' 5 The court explained that in determining whether
substantial evidence supports the Board's holding that an illegal motive
was a factor in the discharge, the appellate court must consider all the
evidence.26 The Fourth Circuit warned the Board that, because the
'9 551 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1977).
650 F.2d at 490. In Neptune Water Meter Co. v. NLRB, the employer discharged
two union supporters allegedly for tardiness and excessive absenteeism, 551 F.2d 568, 569
(4th Cir. 1977). The Fourth Circuit upheld an NLRB finding of discrimination because the
employer did not discharge the two employees until after they became union activists. See
Id. at 569, 570.
21 551 F.2d at 569. The Fourth Circuit in Neptune stated that the Board's findings of
tardiness and absenteeism did not impair the Board's findings of discriminatory motivation
because the discriminatory motive need only be a "factor" in the discharge. Id. The Neptune
opinion does not define the word "factor." See text accompanying notes 40-44 infra.
' Neptune Water Meter Co. v. NLRB, 551 F.2d at 570. The Neptune court stated that
the Board must weigh all relevant factors, particularly the gravity of the offense allegedly
committed by the employee, and may only find an unfair labor practice if the record sup-
ports the view that the employer would not have fired the employee "except for" the
employee's union activity. Id.
' The Kiawah Fourth Circuit panel included Judges Winter, Sprouse and Ervin, with
Judge Sprouse writing the majority opinion. 650 F.2d at 487.
24 Id. at 490. The Fourth Circuit in Kiawah acknowledged that a shifting burden of
proof concept is useful when a case includes evidence of both discriminatory and valid
motives for the discharge. Id. An employer has the burden of rebutting initial evidence of
union membership and employer animus. Id. The Kiawah court stressed, however, that the
ultimate burden is always upon the General Counsel to prove that the discriminatory
motive was a "factor" in the discharge. Id. The court stated that the burden is on the
General Counsel to show an affirmative and persuasive reason why the employer rejected
the legal motive for discharge and chose an illegal one. Id. at 491.
"Id.; see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951); 29 U.S.C. § 160(f)
(1976); note 1 supra.
1 650 F.2d at 491. The Kiawah court emphasized that a court must consider the
employer's evidence of proper motivation and not merely the employee's evidence of
discriminatory motive. Id. The Fourth Circuit declared that an employee's union member-
ship or an employer's union animus by themselves do not taint a discharge for cause. Id. The
evidence must show why a legal motive was not the sole reason for the discharge. Id.
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General Counsel has the affirmative burden of proving his case, evidence
consisting of conjecture or suspicion will not sustain the burden.' The
court concluded by restating the Fourth Circuit's rule that if an
employer has a valid reason to discharge an employee, but would not
have done so except for the employee's union activity, the discharge
violates section 8(a)(3) of the Act.2
Addressing the instant facts, the Fourth Circuit in Kiawah stated
that Kiawah presented unrebutted evidence that the company discharged
the two employees for reasons unrelated to union activity.' The court,
relying on Neptune, stated that an employee cannot shield unsatisfac-
tory behavior from discipline by joining a union." The Kiawah court ruled
that the direct evidence of the company's valid business reasons for dis-
charging Hymes and Murray far outweighed the circumstantial evidence
of improper motivation, and that the latter evidence was not substantial.31
The Kiawah court, consequently, denied enforcement of the Board's find-
ing of a section 8(a)(3) violation.2
2id.
2 Id.
I Id. The Fourth Circuit in Kiawah found that Kiawah experienced continual kitchen
cleaning problems before and after the company discharged Hymes and Murray, that
Kiawah continuously attempted to rectify the problem and that Kiawah expressed disap-
proval with the work of Hymes and Murray preceding any union contact. Id.
3 Id.; see Neptune Water Meter Co. v. NLRB, 551 F.2d at 570.
", 650 F.2d at 491. Judge Winter felt that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to
support the Board's order. Id. at 492 (Winter, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Winter
argued that the circumstances showed a disparity of treatment between Hymes and Murray
and several other non-managerial kitchen employees who only received disciplinary warn-
ings when Kiawah discharged Hymes and Murray, Id. at 492-93.
2 650 F.2d at 491. Although the Fourth Circuit in Kiawah denied enforcement of the
Board's order regarding the § 8(a)(3) violation, the court enforced the Board's order relating
to the § 8(a)(1) violation. Id. at 489; see note 14 supra. Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA prohibits
employer interference with the rights guaranteed in § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976), includ-
ing the rights to form a union, to bargain collectively, and to engage in other "concerted ac-
tivities:' Id. at § 157 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979); see note 1 supra. To prove a § 8(a)(1) violation,
the General Counsel must show employer interference with employees acting in a group ef-
fort, or "concerted activity." See Western Cartridge Co. v. NLRB, 139 F.2d 855, 858 (7th
Cir. 1943); BARTosIC, supra note 1, at 60. In contrast to § 8(a)(1), an employer violates § 8(a)(3)
only if union activity is involved. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976); note 2 supra. In addition,
the employer's motivation, crucial to a court's finding a § 8(a)(3) violation, see note 2 supra,
is immaterial in establishing a § 8(a)(1) violation. See NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S.
21, 23 (1964); Stein Seal Co. v. NLRB, 605 F.2d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1979); NLRB v. McCatron,
216 F.2d 212, 2;5 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955). The inferences that
employees draw from employer action, and the effects such inferences have on employee
behavior determine whether an employer has violated § 8(a)(1). See NLRB v. McCatron, 216
F.2d at 215; BARTosIC, supra note 1, at 60. The customary remedy for a § 8(a)(1) violation is a
Board order requiring the employer to cease and desist from the interfering activity. See
United Steelworkers of Am. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 770, 772-73 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 932 (1967); BARTosiC, supra note 1, at 66.
In enforcing the Board's finding of a § 8(a)(1) violation, the Fourth Circuit in Kiawah
cited the rule established in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969), stating
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In Kiawah, the Fourth Circuit adopted the language of earlier
Fourth Circuit opinions for section 8(a)(3) cases involving both legal and
illegal discharge motives.3 The Fourth Circuit requires the General
Counsel to carry the ultimate burden of persuasion throughout the
trial. 4 The Fourth Circuit, however, places upon the employer a burden
of producing some evidence of a legitimate reason for the discharge once
the General Counsel has established a prima facie case of discrimination."
that a court should evaluate an employer's actions in light of the fact that employees are
more sensitive to their employer's implications than are outsiders. 650 F.2d at 489. The
Kiawah court also cited the rule from Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477
(1951), stating that when substantial evidence supports the Board's findings, a circuit court
will not substitute its own judgment for that of the Board. 650 F.2d at 489; note 1 supra. The
Fourth Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the Board's findings of a § 8(a)(1)
violation on the facts in Kiawah. 650 F.2d at 489; see note 14 supra.
The Fourth Circuit's finding of a § 8(a)(1) violation is consistent with other decisions
under the section. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969); Mueller Brass
Co. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 815, 820-21 (5th Cir. 1977). A campaign for union organization
qualifies as "concerted activity" within §§ 7 and 8(a)(1). See, e.g., Brown & Root, Inc. v.
NLRB, 634 F.2d 816, 818 (5th Cir. 1981) (§ 8(a)(1) protects employees' activities if those activ-
ities reasonably may affect terms and conditions of employment); Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v.
NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1348-49 (3d Cir. 1969) (any expression inclined to produce or even sug-
gesting group or representative action is concerted activity), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935
(1970). A court reasonably could hold employer threats of harm to employees or denial of
raises because of union activity to be coercive of employee rights in a protected area. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1968) (employer may make prediction to
employees concerning effects he thinks union will have on company, but employer must
base predictions on objective fact and include no threats); NLRB v. International Medication
Syss. Ltd., 640 F.2d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir. 1981) (threats by employer of reprisals and plant
closing if union is successful are unlawful); Midwest Regional Joint Bd., Amal. Clothing
Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 434, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (employer threats that company
will be tougher on employees if union succeeds are unlawful). In Mueller Brass Co. v. NLRB,
544 F.2d 815, 821 (5th Cir. 1977), the court stated that in determining whether employer con-
versations with employees are coercive, a court should look at several factors. These factors
include the history of the company's attitude toward employees, the type of information
sought, the rank of the officer seeking information, the place and manner of the conversa-
tion, the truthfulness of the employee's responses, whether the company had a valid pur-
pose in getting the information, whether the officer communicated that purpose to the
employee and whether the company assured the employee of no reprisals. Id.
650 F.2d at 490-91.
See American Thread Co. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 316, 320-21 (4th Cir. 1980); American
Mfg. Assocs, Inc. v. NLRB, 594 F.2d 30, 36 (4th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Patrick Plaza Dodge,
Inc., 522 F.2d 804, 807 (4th Cir. 1975).
' See, e.g., American Thread Co. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 316, 321 (4th Cir. 1980) (inference
of discriminatory motive in discharge of union supporter disappears when employer offers
reasonable business explanation); NLRB v. Appletree Chevrolet Inc., 608 F.2d 988, 993 (4th
Cir. 1979) (when employer has supportable cause for discharge, burden shifts to General
Counsel); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 1335, 1337 (4th Cir. 1976) (when
employer demonstrates good ground for discharge apart from union animus, Board cannot
declare ground pretextual without basis); Maphis Chapman Corp. v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 298,
304 (4th Cir. 1966) (once General Counsel presents prima facie case, employer must assume
burden of showing justifiable reason for discharge). The employer does not bear the burden
of production until the General Counsel presents a prima facie case. See Maphis Chapman
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After the employer has come forward with 'evidence of a legitimate
discharge motive, the General Counsel must show by substantial
evidence an affirmative reason why the employer depended upon an il-
legal motivation and not a legal one. 8
The Kiawah court also addressed the extent to which the illegal
motive may affect the employer's discharge decision without violating
section 8(a)(3). In Kiawah and Neptune, the Fourth Circuit emphasized
that an employer violates section 8(a)(3) if a discriminatory motive is a
"factor" in the discharge.3 7 The Fourth Circuit combined this require-
ment, however, with the stipulation that the General Counsel prove that
the employer would not have discharged the employee "except for" his
union activity.'
By using both "factor" and "except for" language, Fourth Circuit
opinions are confusing because the two phrases imply different stan-
dards for finding a section 8(a)(3) violation. 9 In stating that an illegal
Corp. v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 298, 304 (4th Cir. 1966). Basically, the General Counsel establishes
a prima facie case by showing employer's knowledge of employee's union activities, and the
employer's union animus. See American Thread Co. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 316, 321 (4th Cir.
1980]; Maphis Chapman Corp. v. NLRB, 368 F.2d at 304.
I See American Thread Co. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 316, 321 (4th Cir. 1980); NLRB v.
Appletree Chevrolet, Inc., 608 F.2d 988, 993 (4th Cir. 1979); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
NLRB, 539 F.2d 1335, 1337 (4th Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Patrick Plaza Dodge, Inc., 522 F.2d 804,
807 (4th Cir. 1975); note 24 supra.
I See 650 F.2d at 490; Neptune Water Meter Co. v. NLRB, 551 F.2d 568, 569 (4th Cir.
1977). In NLRB v. Dove Coal Co., 369 F.2d 849, 852 (4th Cir. 1966), the Fourth Circuit held
for the first time that if a discriminatory motive was at least a "factor" in the employer's
decision, the discharge was discriminatory. Since Dove Coal, most Fourth Circuit cases
dealing with the extent to which the illegal motive may affect the employer's discharge deci-
sion have adopted the "factor" language. See American Thread Co. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 316,
320 (4th Cir. 1980); Neptune Water Meter Co. v. NLRB, 551 F.2d 568, 569 (4th Cir. 1977);
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 448 F.2d 8,13 n.16 (4th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery
Division, Hanes Corp., 413 F.2d 457, 458 (4th Cir. 1969); Winchester Spinning Corp. v.
NLRB, 402 F.2d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 1968). But see Filler Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 369,
377-78 (4th Cir. 1967) (Fourth Circuit states that court must weigh circumstances to deter-
mine what motivation dominated employer) (citing NLRB v. Jones Sausage Co., 257 F.2d
878, 882 (4th Cir. 1958)).
1 The Fourth Circuit has not used the "except for" requirement as consistently as the
"factor" requirement. See note 37 supra. In Kiawah, American Thread and Neptune, the
court used the "except for" and "factor" requirements concurrently-. See 650 F.2d at 490-91;
American Thread Co. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 316, 320 (4th Cir. 1980); Neptune Water Meter Co.
v. NLRB, 551 F.2d 568, 569-70 (4th Cir. 1977). In NLRB v. Appletree Chevrolet, Inc., 608
F.2d 988, 995 (4th Cir. 1979), the Fourth Circuit mentioned only the "but for" requirement
and omitted the "factor" requirement. Since Appletree concerned primarily the distribution
of the burden of proof in § 8(a)(3) cases, the court used the "but for" language to
demonstrate the General Counsers burden and the omission of the "factor" language is not
significant. See id. at 993-95; text accompanying notes 34-36 supra. The only other case in
which the Fourth Circuit used the "but for" language is NLRB v. Jones Sausage Co., 257
F.2d 878, 881 (4th Cir. 1958). In Jones Sausage, the court combined the "but for" language
with a requirement that the court weigh the circumstances of each case to determine what
motivations "truly dominated" the employer's decision. Id. at 881-82.
" See text accompanying notes 40-50 infra.
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motive need only be a "factor" in the employer's discharge decision, the
Fourth Circuit suggests that a discharge is illegal if the discriminatory
motive played any part in the employer's decision.4" In Winn-Dixie
Stores, Inc. v. NLRB,4 ' the Fourth Circuit stated that the Board found
that the employer discharged an employee "at least in part" because of
the employee's union activity.42 In an explanatory footnote, the court ex-
plained that a discharge is unlawful if a discriminatory motive is "at
least a factor" causing the discharge.43 The Fourth Circuit in Winn-Dixie,
therefore, held that under the "factor" test, a section 8(a)(3) violation ex-
ists if the employee's union activity played a part in the employer's
discharge decision.44 The NLRB and several circuit courts besides the
Fourth Circuit have used an "in part" test under which an employer
violates section 8(a)(3) if the employee's participation in the protected ac-
tivities plays any part in the discharge.
4 5
In comparison, the "except for" language represents a "dominant
motive" test, rather than an "in part" test." In NLRB v. Jones Sausage
Co.,47 the Fourth Circuit stated that business motives could not shield an
employer who would not have discharged an employee "but for" the
employee's union activity.4" The Jones Sausage court then held that an
employer violates section 8(a)(3) if discriminatory motives "truly
dominated" the employer's decision to discharge the employee. 9 The
First Circuit has applied a "dominant motive" test using "but for"
language under which the General Counsel must prove that an illegal
motive dominated or controlled the employer's decision.
40 See text accompanying notes 41-45 infra.
448 F.2d 8 (4th Cir. 1971).
42 Id. at 13. The Winn-Dixie court denied enforcement of the Board's order finding a §
8(a)(3) violation in the discharge of an employee because the Fourth Circuit found no
evidence that the employer knew of the employee's union activities. Id. at 13-14.
4 Id. at 13 n.16 (citing Winchester Spinning Corp. v. NLRB, 402 F.2d 299, 304 (4th Cir.
1968)).
448 F.2d at 13.
'5 The NLRB followed the "in part" test for years. See Wright Line, A Div. of Wright
Line, Inc., 251 NLRB Dec. 17,356 at 32463-64 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981)
(citing examples). In Wright Line the Board formally abandoned the "in part" test. See id.;
text accompanying note 80 infra. The 8th, 10th and District of Columbia Circuits presently
use the "in part" test. See Berbiglia, Inc. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 839, 843 (8th Cir. 1979)
(discharge unlawful unless predicated solely on valid grounds); M.S.P. Indus., Inc. v. NLRB,
568 F.2d 166, 173-75 (10th Cir. 1977) (employer violates § 8(a)(3) if union animus was material
part of motive for discharge); Allen v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 976, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (discharge
unlawful if motivated even in part by union animus). See also notes 50 & 82 infra.
" See NLRB v. Jones Sausage Co., 257 F.2d 878, 881-82 (4th Cir. 1958). See also Filler
Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 369, 377-78 (4th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Overnite Transp. Co.,
308 F.2d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 1962).
', 257 F.2d 878 (4th Cii'. 1958).
" Id. at 881.
'9 Id. at 882. Applying the "dominant motive" test, the Fourth Circuit in Jones
Sausage found substantial evidence to support the Board's finding that the employer laid off
two employees because of their union activities. Id. at 880-82.
o See NLRB v. Fibers Int'l Corp., 439 F.2d 1311, 1315 (1st Cir. 1971) (on petition for
rehearing) (per curiam). The First Circuit was the first court to reject the Board's "in part"
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Despite the conflicting "factor" and "but for" language, the Fourth
Circuit applies a "dominant motive" rather than an "in part" test.
Although the Winn-Dixie court equated "factor" with "in part,"'" other
Fourth Circuit cases intend "factor" to mean a "but for" or "motivating"
factor necessary for the "dominant motive" test. 2 The early Fourth Cir-
cuit cases applied a "dominant motive" test. 3 In NLRB v. Jones Sausage
Co., the Fourth Circuit first enunciated a dominant motive test by look-
ing for the motive that truly dominated the employer's discharge deci-
sion.5  The Fourth Circuit cited and applied the Jones Sausage "domi-
nant motive" test in NLRB v. Overnite Transportation Co." and Filler
Products, Inc. v. NLRB.' More recent Fourth Circuit opinions use the
"factor" language which normally denotes an "in part" test. 8 The Fourth
Circuit, however, uses "factor" language to indicate a "dominant motive"
test. The recent Fourth Circuit opinions, rather than overruling the early
"dominant motive" cases, cited the early cases as support for the
"factor" requirement. 9 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, equates the pre-
sent "factor" language with the "dominant motive" test enunciated in
earlier Fourth Circuit cases.
Another indication that the Fourth Circuit is applying a "dominant
motive" test is the court's requirement that the General Counsel prove
that the employer would not have discharged the employee "but for" the
employee's union activity." The "but for" language usually accompanies
the "dominant motive" test.6 In addition, the Fourth Circuit places a
burden on the General Counsel to show an affirmative reason why the
test and to substitute a "dominate motive" test. See NLRB v. Whitin Machine Works, 204
F.2d 883, 885 (1st Cir. 1953). Several other circuits since have adopted the "dominant
motive" test. See NLRB v. International Medication Syss. Ltd., 640 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.
1981); Berry Schools v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 692, 704-05 (5th Cir. 1980); Waterbury Community
Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1978). See also Wright Line, A Div. of
Wright Line, Inc., 251 NLRB Dec. 17,356 at 32464-65 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1981); Note, Wright Line: The NLRB Adopts the Mt. Healthy Test for Dual Motive
Discharge Cases Under the LMRA, 32 MERCER L. REV. 933, 935-37 (1981).
" See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 448 F.2d 8, 13 n.16 (4th Cir. 1971); text accom-
panying notes 41-44 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 53-64 infra.
13 See text accompanying notes 54-57 infra.
5 257 F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1958).
"Id. at 882; see text accompanying notes 47-49 supra; note 38 supra.
- 308 F.2d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 1962).
- 376 F.2d 369, 377-78 (4th Cir. 1967).
" See Neptune Water Meter Co. v. NLRB, 551 F.2d 568, 569 (4th Cir. 1977); Winn-
Dixie Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 448 F.2d 8, 13 n.16 (4th Cir. 1971).
" See Neptune Water Meter Co. v. NLRB, 551 F.2d 568, 569 (4th Cir. 1977) (citing
Filler Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 369, 377 (4th Cir. 1967); Winchester Spinning Corp. v.
NLRB, 402 F.2d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 1968)); Winchester Spinning Corp. v. NLRB, 402 F.2d 299,
304 (4th Cir. 1968) (citing NLRB v. Dove Coal Co., 369 F.2d 849, 852 (4th Cir. 1966)); NLRB v.
Dove Coal Co., 369 F.2d 849, 852 (4th Cir. 1966) (citing NLRB v. Overnite Transp. Co., 308
F.2d 284, 284-85 (4th Cir. 1962)).
" See text accompanying notes 46-50 supra.
61 Id.
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employer rejected a good cause and relied on an illegal motive for the
discharge."2 The Fourth Circuit places the "affirmative reason" burden
on the General Counsel, following First Circuit "dominant motive" opin-
ions . 3 The "dominant motive" test, consequently, provided the basis for
both the Fourth Circuit's burden of proof requirement and motive re-
quirement. 4
The "in part" test differs significantly in practical terms from the
"dominant motive" test. If an employer discharges an employee for
three reasons, one of which is the employee's union activity, the
employer is guilty of a section 8(a))3) violation under the "in part" test
regardless of the weight the employer accords the different discharge
reasons.'5 Under the "dominant motive" test, however, the employer is
not guilty of a violation unless the General Counsel can prove that the
employer would not have discharged the employee had the employer only
considered the two legitimate reasons. Both the "dominant motive" and
the "in part" tests are legitimate tests. Lack of a clear analytical
framework, however, weakens the Fourth Circuit's "dominant motive"
test. 7 The analytical framework confuses practitioners over how the
Fourth Circuit will apply the dual motivation test.
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit, the First Circuit, in NLRB v.
Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc.,69 articulated a section 8(a)(3)
test within a well-defined analytical framework. In Wright Line, the
First Circuit held that once the General Counsel establishes a prima
facie case of discrimination,71 the employer has a burden of producing a
legitimate reason for the discharge.2 If the employer satisfies this
82 See note 36 supra.
See NLRB v. Patrick Plaza Dodge, Inc., 522 F.2d 804, 807 (4th Cir. 1975) (citing
NLRB v. Billen Shoe Co., 397 F.2d 801, 803 (1st Cir. 1968)).
See text accompanying notes 52-63 supra.
See Wright Line, A Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 251 NLRB Dec. 17,356 at 32463-64,
32465-66 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981).
" See NLRB v. Fibers Int'l Corp., 439 F.2d 1311, 1315 (1st Cir. 1971) (on petition for
rehearing) (per curiam). See also NLRB v. Billen Shoe Co., 397 F.2d 801, 803 (1st Cir. 1968);
NLRB v. Lowell Sun Publ. Co., 320 F.2d 835, 842 (1st Cir. 1963) (Aldrich, J., concurring).
17 See text accompanying notes 39-50 supra.
Compare Wright Line, A Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 251 NLRB Dec. 17,356 at 32472
n.9 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981) (Fourth Circuit applies "dominant motive"
test) and Note, Wright Line, The NLRB Adopts the Mt. Healthy Test for Dual Motive
Discharge Cases Under the LMRA, 32 MERCER L. REV. 933, 936 (1981) (Fourth Circuit ap-
plies "dominant motive" test in "pretext" format) with DuRoss, Toward Rationality in
Discriminatory Discharge Cases: The Impact of Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle
Upon the NLRA, 66 GEo. L. J. 1109, 1111 n.16 (1978) (the Fourth Circuit has accepted
Board's "in part" test).
69 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981).
70 Id. at 904-07.
71 See text accompanying note 80 infra.
72 NLRB v. Wright Line, A Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d 899, 904-07 (1st Cir.
1981).
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burden of production, the General Counsel must prove that the employer
would not have discharged the employee but for his union activity.73
The First Circuit's Wright Line test is a modification of a test for-
mulated by the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle." Mt. Healthy involved a refusal to rehire
which allegedly violated the employee's first amendment rights.7 5 The
Supreme Court stated that the employee first must show that his par-
ticipation in the protected activity was a "substantial factor" in the deci-
sion not to rehire .7 The Court held that the burden of proof then shifts
to the employer to show that it would not have rehired the employee
regardless of the employee's participation in the protected activity.7 '
In Wright Line, the employer discharged a union activist allegedly
for filing inaccurate time reports.78 The employee filed a complaint with
the NLRB.79 In its decision, the NLRB abandoned the "in part" test and
adopted the Mt. Healthy test for the section 8(a)(3) context." As applied
to section 8(a)(3), the Mt. Healthy test provides that the General Counsel
initially must establish a prima facie case by showing that the employee's
participation in protected activity was a substantial factor in the refusal,
to rehire.8 If the General Counsel establishes a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that he would have reached the same decision regardless of the
employee's participation in protected activity.2
3 Id.
74 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977); see NLRB v. Wright Line, A Div. of Wright Line, Inc.,
662 F.2d at 904-07.
" See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 283-84. In Mt.
Healthy, the City School Board decided not to rehire a teacher for the stated reasons that
he nade an obscene gesture towards a student and conveyed the contents of a confidential
memorandum regarding the faculty dress code to a radio station. Id. at 283-84. The Supreme
Court held that the first amendment's free speech provision protected conveyance of the
dress code memo. See id. at 284. However, the school board legally could have refused to
rehire Doyle because of the obscene gesture incident. Id. at 285. Thus, the school board had
two possible reasons for refusing to rehire Doyle, one permissible and one impermissible
under the first amendment. See id. at 284-85.
71 Id. at 287.
77 Id.
NLRB v. Wright Line, A Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d at 900.
Id.
See Wright Line, A Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 251 NLRB Dec. 17,356 at 32467-69
(1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (lst Cir. 1981).
Id. at 32468-69.
Id. The Board adopted the Mt. Healthy test in an attempt to clarify the burden
allocation process in dual motive cases and to alleviate confusion caused by rejection of the
"in part" test by many of the circuit courts. See NLRB v. International Medication Syss.
Ltd., 640 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 1981); Berry Schools v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 692, 704-05 (5th
Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Eastern Smelt. & Ref. Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 670-71 (1st Cir. 1979); Water-
bury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 98-99 (2d Cir. 1978). Several circuit
courts adopted the Board's Wright Line test before the First Circuit reviewed the Board's
decision. See NLRB v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 651 F.2d 442, 446 (6th Cir. 1981); NLRB v.
Nevis Indus., Inc., 647 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1981); Peavey Co. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 460, 461
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When the First Circuit reviewed the Board's order in Wright Line,
the court adopted the Board's test in every aspect except that the court
put the final burden of proof on the General Counsel and not on the
employer.13 The First Circuit organized the test to delineate clearly the
(7th Cir. 1981); Statler Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 644 F.2d 902, 905 (lst Cir. 1981). In Eastern
Smelting, the First Circuit abandoned its "dominant motive" test in favor of the Mt.
Healthy test. See 598 F.2d 666, 671 (1st Cir. 1979). Then, in Statler Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, the
First Circuit approved the Board's Wright Line decision as a conscientious effort to reduce
confusion in dual motive cases in the § 8(a)(3) area. See Statler Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 644
F.2d 902, 905 (1st Cir. 1981). In its Wright Line decision modifying the Mt. Healthy test, the
First Circuit expressly overruled contrary portions of Eastern Smelting and Statler. See
NLRB v. Wright Line, A Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d at 905 n.10. When Wright Line
partially overruled Statler, a brief period of harmony between the Board and the First Cir-
cuit ended. The First Circuit and other circuits have criticized the Board not only for the "in
part" test, but also for how the Board applies the test to the facts. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Eastern Smelt. & Ref. Corp.,,598 F.2d 666, 669-70 (1st Cir. 1979) (Board errs in labelling good
reason "pretextual" without adequate consideration and in applying "in part" test);
American Mfg. Assocs. v. NLRB, 594 F.2d 30, 37 (4th Cir. 1979) (when employer had good
motive for discharge, Board cannot declare motive pretext without affirmative and per-
suasive reason); NLRB v. Billen Shoe Co., 397 F.2d 801, 802-03 (1st Cir. 1968) (Board must
look at all evidence and not just that of one side); Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs
v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 130, 138 n.1 (2d Cir. 1963) (Friendly, J., concurring) (disturbed by common
practice of Board examiners of supporting findings by declaring one witness credible and
another not credible without explanation).
See NLRB v. Wright Line, A Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d at 905-07 (1st Cir.
1981). The First Circuit affirmed its view expressed in Eastern Smelting and Statler that
the Mt. Healthy "but for" standard is the best test for causation in mixed motive cases. Id.
at 903. See Statler Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 644 F.2d 902, 905 (1st Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Eastern
Smelt. & Ref. Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 671 (1st Cir. 1979). The court stated that if the employer
would have discharged the employee regardless of the employee's participation in the pro-
tected activity, then the impermissible motive had no effect and is no more an unfair labor
practice than an unexecuted evil intent is a crime. NLRB v. Wright Line, A Div. of Wright
Line, Inc., 662 F.2d at 903.
In support of placing the final burden of proof upon the employer, the Board in Wright
Line relied upon NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 32-35 (1967). See Wright
Line, A Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 251 NLRB Dec. 17,356 at 32468 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d
899 (1st Cir. 1981). Great Dane arose because an employer refused to pay striking
employees accrued vacation benefits. 388 U.S. at 27. The Supreme Court held that once the
General Counsel proves that the employer engaged in discriminatory conduct which slightly
could have affected employee rights, the burden is upon the employer to prove that
legitimate reasons motivated the dismissal. Id. at 34; see note 2 supra. The Board felt
justified in placing the burden of proof upon the employer because such a structure balanc-
ed the competing interests of employers and employees. Wright Line, A Div. of Wright
Line, Inc., 251 NLRB Dec. 17,356 at 32468 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981).
The advantage to this structure, according to the Supreme Court, is that the burden of
proof of motivation is on the party to whom the proof is most accessible. NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967).
The First Circuit; in placing the ultimate burden of proof upon the General Counsel,
stated that Great Dane was inapposite in Wright Line because Great Dane involved a
challenge to an employer's overall policy and not a single discharge. NLRB v. Wright Line,
A Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d at 904 n.8. In addition, the employer in Great Dane ad-
mitted discrimination, while in Wright Line discrimination was at issue. Id. The First Cir-
cuR also stated that when a party merely must rebut a prima facie case, that party should
never have the burden of proof. Id. at 904; see FED. R. EVID. 301; 9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §
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duties of each party." The General Counsel first must prove that the
employee's participation in the protected activity was a substantial fac-
tor in the employer's decision." Second, the employer must produce
some evidence showing the existence of a legitimate business reason for
the discharge. Third, the General Counsel must prove that the employer
would not have discharged the employee but for the employee's pro-
tected activity. 7 At each step, the test sets forth and allocates the
burden of proof. The test clearly states that for the employer to violate
section 8(a)(3) the illegal motive must be both a substantial factor and the
"but for" cause of the discharge.8
The Fourth Circuit test and the Wright Line test are substantively
very similar. Both place a burden of production on the employer after
the General Counsel establishes a prima facie case.89 Both tests also
place the ultimate burden upon the General Counsel to show that the
discharge would not have occurred "but for" the protected activity. 0
The Wright Line test, however, presents a well-defined analytical
framework. The step-by-step progression of the Wright Line test clearly
establishes the final "but for" requirement. The Fourth Circuit test, on
the other hand, causes confusion as to the weight of the final burden
because of the conflict between the "factor" language and the "but for"
language." The Fourth Circuit, when next presented with a section
8(a)(3) dual motive case, should consider adaptation of a framework
similar to that announced by the First Circuit in Wright Line.
MELVIN T. RATTRAY
2487, at 281-2 (3d ed. 1940). Finally, the First Circuit pointed out a distinction between Mt.
Healthy and most § 8(a)(3) cases which justified reversing the Mt. Healthy allocation of the
burden of proof. The court stated that in Mt. Healthy the employer admitted violating the
employee's constitutional rights, thus making the "but for" analysis an affirmative defense
which justified placing the burden of proof on the defendant. NLRB v. Wright Line, A Div.
of Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d at 906. On the other hand, in § 8(a)(3) cases, the employer does
not admit to a discriminatory practice, so the legitimate motive evidence is not an affir-
mative defense, but merely rebuts a prima facie case. Id. Thus, the burden of proving that'
the employer would not have discharged the employee in the absence of union activity is
properly upon the General Counsel. Id. at 906-07. The Supreme Court has imposed the same
proof structure in the analogous Title VII area as the First Circuit imposed in Wright Line.
See generally Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
See NLRB v. Wright Line, A Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d at 902-07.
See id- at 901-02. Cf. American Thread Co. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 316, 321 (4th Cir. 1980)
(General Counsel establishes prima facie case by showing employer's knowledge of
employee's union activities and employer's union animus).
See NLRB v. Wright Line, A Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d at 907.
See id. at 903.
See id. at 902-07.
', Compare id. at 901-02 with Maphis Chapman Corp. v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 298, 304 (4th
Cir. 1966).
" Compare NLRB v. Wright Line, A Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d at 903-04 with
NLRB v. Kiawah Island Co., 650 F.2d at 490.
" See text accompanying notes 39-50 supra.
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